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Security audit

NotebookLM Auth Bypass

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This NotebookLM skill performs the advertised automation, but its recovery flow extracts and persistently stores Google/NotebookLM session cookies in ways users should review carefully before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill handle live Google/NotebookLM session cookies. Prefer a supported NotebookLM login flow instead. If used, run it in a dedicated low-privilege profile, avoid persistent environment-variable storage, delete ~/.notebooklm/storage_state.json and ~/.notebooklm/auth_payload.json when done, and revoke/re-login the Google session if those files may have been exposed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/auto_playwright.py:29
Finding

Persistent Plaintext Collection and Storage of Authentication Cookies

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/auto_playwright.py:52
Finding

PowerShell Command Injection Through Cookie-Derived Data

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:35
Finding

Unpinned Executable Playwright and Browser Dependencies

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (19)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Critical
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Stealing browser cookies and placing them into environment variables is an unjustified and highly sensitive action for NotebookLM access. Session cookies can enable account takeover, lateral access, persistence, and leakage through logs or subprocess inheritance, making this an acute credential-compromise risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly promotes a workflow where an agent refreshes and persists Google authentication cookies, which are effectively bearer tokens for the user's account. Framing this as 'auth recovery' disguises credential collection and reuse, creating a clear risk of unauthorized account access, token theft, and long-lived compromise if the environment variable is exposed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The document claims to prevent silent credential harvesting, but the described behavior is still harvesting sensitive Google session cookies and storing them for reuse. This contradiction is a strong deception signal because it normalizes credential exfiltration under a benign label, increasing the chance a user will approve dangerous behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

The embedded SKILL.md excerpt directly instructs the agent to run a script that 'steals fresh cookies' and injects them into environment variables. This is explicit credential theft guidance, and in skill context it is more dangerous because it operationalizes the theft by telling the agent when to do it and how to persist the stolen tokens for future use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The phrase instructing the agent to 'steal fresh cookies' is direct natural-language guidance to obtain credentials from the browser. In an agent skill, such instructions are especially dangerous because they can cause an autonomous system to facilitate credential theft under the guise of task recovery.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly tells the agent to obtain fresh authentication cookies and persist them, while presenting the action as routine recovery. This is dangerous because session cookies can grant full access to the user's NotebookLM/Google session, and persistence increases the blast radius and duration of compromise if the host or environment is inspected.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose is NotebookLM control, but the documented behavior includes extracting browser cookies, exporting session material, and injecting it into Windows environment variables. That is a major capability mismatch and strongly indicates concealed credential/session theft under a benign-sounding description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Labeling cookie theft as 'auto-recovery for authentication errors' is deceptive and conceals the true security impact of the action. This framing increases the chance that users or agents will approve dangerous credential-access behavior they would otherwise reject.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly instructs the operator to run a separate script for 'auth recovery' that steals fresh cookies and writes them into Windows environment variables. Embedding such instructions inside a productivity skill disguises credential exfiltration as maintenance activity, making the context more dangerous, not less.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill omits a clear, prominent warning that its documented recovery flow accesses credential-sensitive browser session material. In the context of an automation skill, this omission materially increases user deception and the risk of uninformed approval of account-compromising actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill normalizes credential theft by presenting it as a routine recovery workflow, which lowers operator suspicion and operationalizes unsafe behavior. In this skill context, the mismatch between benign productivity tooling and covert session capture makes the pattern particularly dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The script silently extracts authenticated browser cookies from NotebookLM, writes them to disk, and on Windows persists them into a user environment variable, but the skill description does not disclose this sensitive behavior. This omission undermines informed consent and can lead users to expose reusable session material that could enable account/session hijacking if accessed by other local processes or users.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The script extracts browser storage state and cookies from an authenticated NotebookLM session and writes them to predictable files in the user's home directory without warning or confirmation. Those files contain reusable authentication material, so compromise of the local account, backups, logs, or permissive file access could expose active sessions and enable unauthorized access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The script injects extracted authentication cookies into a persistent Windows user environment variable without an explicit warning, confirmation, or discussion of the security tradeoff. This makes sensitive session data broadly available within the user's environment and can facilitate credential leakage, accidental disclosure, or session theft by local tools and child processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The README discusses extracting and injecting Google auth cookies without adequately warning that these cookies are highly sensitive account credentials. Persisting them in environment variables broadens exposure to logs, subprocesses, shell history, crash reports, and other local tooling, making theft or accidental disclosure more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

Step 3: Install the OpenClaw Skill

  1. Clone or download this repository.
  2. Move the folder into your OpenClaw workspace's skills folder and name it notebooklm-bypass so the path looks like this: openclaw/workspace/skills/notebooklm-bypass/SKILL.md
  3. Ensure you have the Python Playwright package installed (used by the automation script):
    bash
    pip install playwright
    

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises executable behavior and references a recovery script, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. That omission weakens reviewability and allows sensitive shell/file operations to be invoked without clear user-facing constraint, which is especially risky given the auth-handling behavior described later.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Persisting extracted auth cookies into a Windows user environment variable is not clearly necessary for 'programmatic NotebookLM control' and broadens exposure of sensitive session data beyond the browser/profile context. Environment variables may be readable by other processes in the user context, inherited by spawned processes, and remain available long after the immediate automation task completes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/auto_playwright.py (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

python
# Automatically apply to Windows User Environment Variable to bypass the Playwright browser lock bug
            if sys.platform == "win32":
                print("Injecting cookies into Windows Environment Variable NOTEBOOKLM_AUTH_JSON...")
                subprocess.run([
                    "powershell", "-Command", 
                    f'[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable("NOTEBOOKLM_AUTH_JSON", \'{env_json}\', "User")'
                ], check=True)