T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Unpinned Remote Installation Script Is Executed Directly by a Shell
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly coherent for agent-to-agent messaging, but it asks users to run an unverified remote installer and documents persistent network/LLM automation with incomplete safeguards.
Review before installing. Prefer Homebrew or a verified release over the curl-to-shell installer, avoid sending secrets or personal data, keep approval or allowlist mode enabled, do not enable broad wildcards unless intended, use OpenClaw command approval for any handler that reaches an agent, and only enable auto-start after deciding you want a persistent network service.
SKILL.md:25Unpinned Remote Installation Script Is Executed Directly by a Shell
references/security.md:58Optional Setup Registers a Persistent Network Daemon Across Reboots
references/conversational.md:38Remote Message Content Is Injected into a Stateful Agent Prompt
curl ... | sh executes network-fetched code immediately without review, integrity verification, or pinning to a known-good artifact. If the hosting site, transport path, or installer script is compromised, the user can suffer arbitrary code execution under their account.
If not found, install:
curl -sSf https://toq.dev/install.sh | sh && export PATH="$HOME/.toq/bin:$PATH"
Or with Homebrew:
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
If that fails:
pkill -f "toq up" && rm -f ~/.toq/toq.pid
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
If that fails:
pkill -f "toq up" && rm -f ~/.toq/toq.pid
Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.
toq handler add chat --provider anthropic --model claude-sonnet-4-20250514 \
--prompt "You are a helpful assistant" --auto-close
The skill description is broad enough to activate on generic 'communication between AI agents' requests, not just explicit toq usage. That can cause the agent to offer or execute toq-specific setup, networking, or automation steps in contexts the user did not clearly intend, increasing the chance of unnecessary system changes or unsafe command suggestions.
The setup instructions include both execution of a remote installer and an external IP lookup, but the only warning present is about toq being alpha and not about code execution or network metadata disclosure. Users may be guided into running third-party shell code and sending host information to external services without informed consent.
The commands in this section alter trust relationships and access control state (approve, revoke, block, unblock) but the documentation provides no warning about their security consequences. In an agent-to-agent messaging skill, these operations can silently grant unauthorized communication, revoke legitimate access, or block trusted peers, increasing the chance of operator error or unsafe automation.
toq clear-logs is a destructive command that irreversibly removes audit and troubleshooting data, yet the command list does not warn users about data loss. In a secure messaging system, logs may be important for incident response, abuse investigation, and accountability, so undocumented deletion raises operational and security risk.
The documentation says the daemon sends the message and conversation history to an external LLM provider, but it does not explicitly warn users that potentially sensitive inter-agent communications will leave the local environment. In this skill context, messages are specifically between AI agents and may include operational details, tokens, or private data, so silent external sharing increases confidentiality and compliance risk.
The documentation states that LLM responses are scanned and redacted for credential patterns before being sent, but the custom shell handler example forwards $REPLY directly to toq send with no redaction step. In an agent-to-agent messaging skill, this mismatch is dangerous because model output may echo secrets from prior context, logs, prompts, or remote messages and transmit them to another party.
The example handler persists untrusted incoming message content (TOQ_TEXT, TOQ_FROM) to local files without any notice about retention, sensitivity, or access controls. In an agent-to-agent messaging skill, messages may contain secrets, prompts, or personal data, so normalizing persistence in examples can lead operators to store sensitive data unintentionally and expand exposure through local file compromise or backups.
The auto-reply examples reflect or transmit conversation content automatically without guidance about disclosure risks or trust boundaries. In this skill, handlers process messages from other agents automatically, so echoing or forwarding text can leak sensitive or adversarially supplied content to external parties or create unintended propagation of private data.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
### OpenClaw exec tool interaction
This is the most important security consideration. When a remote agent sends a toq message, that message content reaches the AI. If exec is enabled without approval mode, the AI could be influenced by message content to run commands.
Mitigations:
1. Enable OpenClaw's exec approval mode so every command requires human confirmation
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
[Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target EOF sudo mv /tmp/toq.service /etc/systemd/system/toq.service sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo systemctl enable toq
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
[Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target EOF sudo mv /tmp/toq.service /etc/systemd/system/toq.service sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo systemctl enable toq
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
[Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target EOF sudo mv /tmp/toq.service /etc/systemd/system/toq.service sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo systemctl enable toq
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
EOF sudo mv /tmp/toq.service /etc/systemd/system/toq.service sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo systemctl enable toq
On macOS with launchd:
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
On macOS with launchd:
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.toqprotocol.toq.plist << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
On macOS with launchd:
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.toqprotocol.toq.plist << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
On macOS with launchd:
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.toqprotocol.toq.plist << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
On macOS with launchd:
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.toqprotocol.toq.plist << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
On macOS with launchd:
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.toqprotocol.toq.plist << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.toqprotocol.toq.plist << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>Label</key><string>com.toqprotocol.toq</string>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
toq import and toq rotate-keys can significantly change agent identity, restore old state, or disrupt existing peer trust, but the documentation does not warn users about these effects. In this skill's context, key rotation and config restoration directly affect secure communications, so omissions can lead to broken trust chains, message delivery failures, or accidental rollback to unsafe state.