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Security audit

open-market-data

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward financial-data CLI helper, with a supply-chain caveat because it installs an unpinned npm package.

Install only if you are comfortable relying on the open-market-data npm package. Prefer a pinned or reviewed package version for sensitive environments, and avoid configuring financial-data API keys unless you trust how the CLI stores and uses them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:8
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 8-14 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ```yaml metadata: openclaw: requires: bins: [node, omd] install: - kind: node package: open-market-data bins: [omd] homepage: https://github.com/anotb/open-market-data ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill installs the npm package `open-market-data` by its mutable package name without specifying an exact version, integrity hash, or lockfile. It then makes the package-provided `omd` executable available to a Bash-enabled Skill. As a result, the dependency retrieved during a future installation may differ from the version originally reviewed. A compromised registry account, package takeover, malicious release, or upstream compromise could introduce arbitrary code. Such code may execute through npm installation lifecycle scripts or when the Agent invokes `omd`. The package implementation is not included in the audited project, so its behavior cannot be independently verified from this artifact. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `open-market-data` publishing account, upstream release process, or another relevant supply-chain component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the same package name. 3. A user installs or loads the Skill, and the unversioned dependency resolves to the attacker-controlled release. 4. Malicious code executes through a package lifecycle script or a later invocation of the installed `omd` binary. 5. The payload performs actions with the permissions and accessible resources of the Agent process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the Agent user's privileges. Depending on the runtime environment, this may expose files, environment variables, configured financial-data API keys, network access, and any other resources avai ...[truncated 154 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions - Pin `open-market-data` to a specifically reviewed, immutable version rather than resolving the latest release. - Verify and lock the package integrity hash using an appropriate lockfile or equivalent installation metadata. - Ensure installation resolves through an explicitly trusted registry and verify that the package corresponds to the documented upstream repository. - Review the selected package version, including dependencies, executable entry points, and npm lifecycle scripts. - Disable installation lifecycle scripts where operationally feasible. - Consider vendoring the reviewed implementation when reproducible installation and long-term provenance are required. - Run the CLI with least privilege and restrict its access to credentials, files, and network destinations not required for financial-data queries.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.