Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a documented external document-processing API guide, with expected user-directed uploads and credential use rather than hidden local execution or persistence.
Before installing, confirm your organization permits sending invoices, receipts, purchase orders, or other business documents to Laiye's external ADP service. Use scoped credentials where possible, avoid highly sensitive PII until retention and deletion terms are reviewed, and prefer environment variables or a secret store for keys.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
echo "*.env" >> .gitignore echo "openclaw.json" >> .gitignore
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
echo "*.env" >> .gitignore echo "openclaw.json" >> .gitignore
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- [ ] No credentials or secrets are embedded in `SKILL.md` or `package.json`
The quick-start example instructs users to send both document references and authentication material to a third-party SaaS endpoint, but the surrounding text does not prominently disclose that business documents will leave the local environment for external processing. In an enterprise document-processing context, this can cause unintentional exposure of invoices, receipts, or other sensitive records if users assume the skill operates locally or within their own platform boundary.
The example performs a POST to an external API endpoint and includes access credentials plus a document URL, which means document data or pointers to sensitive documents are transmitted off-system. In this skill's context, the entire product is a remote document-processing service, so external transmission is expected, but it is still security-relevant because enterprise users may process confidential financial documents.
curl -X POST "https://adp.laiye.com/open/agentic_doc_processor/laiye/v1/app/doc/extract" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Access-Key: $ADP_ACCESS_KEY" \
-H "X-Timestamp: $(date +%s)" \
The README provides a copy-paste example that sends both a document URL and API credentials to a third-party endpoint, but it does not explicitly warn users that document contents may contain sensitive business or personal data and will be transmitted off-platform. In an agent-skill context, this omission increases the risk of accidental disclosure because users may treat the integration as local or platform-native rather than an external SaaS call.
This example instructs users to POST document references and authentication material to an external API endpoint. While external transmission is core to the product, the security issue is that the README normalizes exfiltration of potentially sensitive documents to a remote service without strong disclosure, minimization guidance, or guardrails.
curl -X POST "https://adp-global.laiye.com/open/agentic_doc_processor/laiye/v1/app/doc/extract" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Access-Key: $ADP_ACCESS_KEY" \
-H "X-Timestamp: $(date +%s)" \
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
export ADP_APP_SECRET="your_key"
# 2. Set restrictive file permissions
chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
# 3. Rotate credentials regularly
# Recommended: Every 90 days
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
export ADP_APP_SECRET="your_key"
# 2. Set restrictive file permissions
chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
# 3. Rotate credentials regularly
# Recommended: Every 90 days
The skill instructs users to send documents and authentication material to an external third-party service. This creates a real data-exfiltration and trust-boundary risk because potentially sensitive enterprise documents are transmitted off-platform for processing, even though the documentation openly discloses this behavior.
curl -X POST "https://adp-global.laiye.com/open/agentic_doc_processor/laiye/v1/app/doc/extract" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Access-Key: $ADP_ACCESS_KEY" \
-H "X-Timestamp: $(date +%s)" \
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
**Security Note:**
- Set file permissions: `chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`
- Never commit this file to version control
- Prefer environment variables or secret stores
- Rotate credentials regularly
This example shows base64-encoding a local document and embedding its full contents in a request body to an external API. That is a genuine external transmission risk because local file contents, which may include sensitive business or personal data, are sent to a remote service and may be exposed through intermediary logging or third-party retention.
# Convert file to base64
file_base64=$(base64 -i document.pdf | tr -d '\n')
curl -X POST "https://adp-global.laiye.com/open/agentic_doc_processor/laiye/v1/app/doc/extract" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Access-Key: $ADP_ACCESS_KEY" \
-H "X-Timestamp: $(date +%s)" \