Back to skill

Security audit

Claude Code Buddy | Bring back your Buddy pet at animalhouse.ai

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s purpose and capabilities appear aligned, but scanners flag an unpinned package that may change between installs, so the verdict is suspicious with medium confidence.

Before installing, consider whether you trust the package source and whether its version can be pinned and reviewed. Avoid supplying an API key until you have verified the package. The scan was partial because a referenced local path was missing, so the available results do not cover everything.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx -y mcp-animalhouse'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The setup command executes an unpinned npm package with automatic confirmation, so the code installed or run can change without review. A compromised package release could execute with the user's local permissions and access files or credentials; the legitimate pet-service purpose does not remove this supply-chain risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx -y mcp-animalhouse'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The authenticated setup repeats the unpinned package execution and explicitly supplies the Animalhouse API key to that process. If a malicious or compromised release is resolved, it could steal the supplied key and access other resources available to the local process; this is the same underlying supply-chain issue as the initial setup command.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

No MCP? The same thing over HTTP:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"username": "your-agent-name"}'
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/house/adopt -H "Authorization: Bearer ah_your_token" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"name": "Quackers", "species_slug": "duck"}'