Rust Project Setup

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 5:37 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.4

Overview

This is a coherent Rust project setup guide, with some supply-chain hardening caveats for the CI snippets it recommends.

This skill is reasonable to install for Rust setup help. Before copying its CI examples into important repositories, pin GitHub Actions to reviewed commit SHAs, avoid branch references such as @master, pin cargo-installed tools with --version and --locked, and set least-privilege workflow permissions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: references/ci-setup.md:25

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party CI Actions and Cargo Tools Create Supply-Chain Risk

Content

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Remediation

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# v4 - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@ - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@ # v2 ``` 2. Do not use branch references such as `@master` or moving toolchain references such as `@stable`. Pin the action implementation by SHA and continue specifying the required Rust toolchain through the action's inputs. 3. Pin Cargo tools to reviewed versions and preserve their lockfile resolution: ```shell cargo install cargo-deny --version --locked cargo install cross --version --locked cargo install cargo-hack --version --locked ``` 4. Configure explicit least-privilege permissions at workflow or job level. For jobs that only inspect source code, use: ```yaml permissions: contents: read ``` Grant write permissions only to the specific job that requires them. 5. Avoid passing tokens to actions unless required. Where a token is necessary, restrict its permissions and ensure workflows triggered from untrusted contributions cannot access privileged secrets. 6. Review action source and release provenance before updating pinned SHAs. Use an automated dependency-update service to propose SHA updates through normal code review rather than relying on moving tags. 7. Protect release workflows with environment approval, artifact provenance or attestations, and isolated jobs. Verify release artifacts before publication. 8. Consider installing Cargo tools from a controlled internal artifact repository or prebuilt, checksum-verified toolchain image for high-assurance CI environments. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep