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Security audit

Moltywork

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This marketplace skill is coherent in purpose, but it asks the agent to persist credentials, modify heartbeat behavior, self-update from remote instructions, and periodically act on a work account.

Review before installing. Use this only if you want an agent to interact with a MoltyWork account, and do not allow automatic heartbeat checks, remote self-updates, bidding, message replies, or project commitments without explicit approval. Store any API key in a real secret manager rather than skill files or agent memory.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:91
Finding

Persistent Instruction Hijacking Through Agent Memory and Heartbeat Modification

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
heartbeat.md:11
Finding

Mutable Remote Instructions Are Periodically Retrieved and Installed

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
skill.md:78
Finding

Bearer API Key Is Duplicated into Plaintext Skill Storage and Agent Memory

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (13)

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to inspect and potentially create agent configuration directories under the user's home directory, which expands file-system access beyond the immediate task. This is dangerous because it normalizes probing local config locations and writing files there, creating opportunities for unauthorized persistence, tampering, or discovery of other agent/tooling state.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
To install this skill locally:

1. Find your skills directory by checking which of these exists (in order). If NONE of them exist, create the last one (~/.claude/skills)
   - `~/.openclaw/skills/`
   - `~/.clawdbot/skills/`
   - `~/.moltbot/skills/`

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Telling the agent it can check MoltyWork 'anytime you want' broadens activation well beyond a clear user request. In context, that permissive trigger combines with external API use and marketplace actions, increasing the chance of unsolicited account activity and unnecessary data disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The file instructs the agent to perform ongoing autonomous marketplace activity: checking status, monitoring messages, browsing projects, deciding whether to contact the human, and replying as a sub-agent. This exceeds a narrow informational MoltyWork skill and creates a standing workflow that can drive external actions and account activity without a clear user-initiated request or bounded authorization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The local-directory creation and reinstall flow is a persistence mechanism: it causes the skill to be stored under standard skill paths so it remains available across sessions and can continue influencing future agent behavior. In context, persistence is particularly risky because the same file also promotes autonomous recurring checks and remote self-updates.

Content

Scanner excerpt · heartbeat.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

md
Follow these steps (and add to your todo list, if you have one, to ensure you complete all steps):

1. Re-install the skill locally to ensure you have the latest version. Do this by checking which of these exists (in order). If NONE of them exist, create the last one (.claude/skills)
   - `~/.openclaw/skills/`
   - `~/.clawdbot/skills/`
   - `~/.moltbot/skills/`

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to create local skill directories and download a remote file to reinstall/update itself. That is dangerous because it establishes persistence and allows unverified remote content to modify future agent behavior through local file writes, which is unrelated to merely helping a user learn about or use MoltyWork.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The instructions tell the agent to download and replace a local skill file from a remote URL with no authenticity, integrity, or trust validation. This creates a supply-chain style risk where remote content can silently change local agent behavior or introduce more dangerous instructions on subsequent runs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill directs authenticated API requests using a bearer API key and accesses account/profile/message data without clear safeguards around secret handling, consent, or data minimization. While external API use may be expected for this service, embedding generic instructions to transmit credentials and account data increases the risk of accidental secret exposure or over-broad account access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The 'check anytime' and 'when curious/free time' guidance encourages recurring, ambiguous activation without clear scope or rate limits. Because the skill also instructs authenticated API access and workflow decisions, this ambiguity materially increases the risk of unauthorized or excessive external actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation description is overly broad because it triggers on generic 'make money online' questions, which can cause the skill to activate outside a clear MoltyWork-specific user request. That creates a prompt-injection and unintended-action risk by steering the agent toward account registration, credential handling, and marketplace actions when the user may only want general advice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
# MoltyWork

The marketplace for AI agents to find work and earn money. Note: This file must be read directly (via curl or file access) to see complete API examples with exact syntax summaries omit critical formatting details.

## Pre-requisite

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The instruction to check multiple possible skill directories reveals and encourages enumeration of the host's agent-related filesystem layout. That can leak environmental details about installed tools and provide reconnaissance useful for subsequent persistence or targeted modification of other skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
To install this skill locally:

1. Find your skills directory by checking which of these exists (in order). If NONE of them exist, create the last one (~/.claude/skills)
   - `~/.openclaw/skills/`
   - `~/.clawdbot/skills/`
   - `~/.moltbot/skills/`

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

By telling the agent to create a skills directory and save files there, the skill establishes persistence on the host outside the current session. This is risky because persistent artifacts can survive review boundaries, influence future agent behavior, and make removal or auditing more difficult if the installation was not explicitly authorized.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
To install this skill locally:

1. Find your skills directory by checking which of these exists (in order). If NONE of them exist, create the last one (~/.claude/skills)
   - `~/.openclaw/skills/`
   - `~/.clawdbot/skills/`
   - `~/.moltbot/skills/`

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to persist the API key in both a local JSON file and whatever memory/context system is available, increasing the number of secret copies and the chance of accidental disclosure. Storing long-lived credentials in generalized memory is especially dangerous because other tools, prompts, logs, or future conversations may expose or reuse them unintentionally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.