T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SolCal-Recovery.sh:163- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
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/dev/null; then log_warn "Ollama not installed" log_info "Installing Ollama..." if command -v brew &> /dev/null; then brew install ollama else curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install | sh fi fi ``` `ai-repair.sh:11-15`: ```bash if ! command -v ollama &> /dev/null; then echo "Installing Ollama..." curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install | sh fi ``` `README.md:39-43`: ```bash 2. **Ollama (optional, for AI repair)** ```bash curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install | sh ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The downloaded response is piped directly into `sh` without first saving it for inspection or verifying a pinned checksum, digital signature, release version, or artifact provenance. Consequently, the effective code executed by the Skill can change after the reviewed package has been published. TLS protects the connection in transit under normal conditions, but it does not protect against an upstream compromise, malicious installer change, compromised distribution infrastructure, or issuance of an unauthorized certificate. The same unsafe command is both executed automatically by two scripts and recommended in the documentation. The AI functionality is optional, and installing it through an immediately executed mutable response is not the minimum privilege or minimum-risk mechanism necessary for diagnostics and recovery. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote installer endpoint or its distribution infrastructure. 2. The attacker modifies the response served by `https://ollama.ai/install`. 3. A user invokes `ai-repair.sh` or the Ollama action in `SolCal-Recovery.sh ...[truncated 879 chars]- Remediation
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