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Security audit

taskforce-loop-engineering

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill coherently manages explicitly requested background tasks, with disclosed installation and approval controls, though its separate runtime was unavailable for inspection.

Use a reviewed, pinned CLI release and treat npx help as executing package code. Review the installation plan, worker permissions and model budget before enabling persistent operation. Keep the dashboard local unless Tailnet access is intended and restricted. This review covers the bundled instructions, not the external runtime or its claimed security enforcement.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The supplied code is a help invocation, not an implementation of the declared workflow. The package name suggests a relationship to the stated purpose, but does not establish that this command performs the promised behavior. Package retrieval is not independently treated as a mismatch, and the package's internal behavior cannot be determined from this snippet.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx -p taskforce-loop-engineering'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The unpinned npx command can download and execute a changing npm release with the agent's host privileges, exposing the host to a compromised or malicious package release. Calling it a 'read-only invocation' is misleading: requesting --help does not prevent package installation or arbitrary initialization code from running. Although this is a CLI rather than an MCP server, the underlying supply-chain concern is valid; the global and source installation examples have similar reproducibility weaknesses.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

Hermes Agent Integration

The core CLI is platform-neutral, but Hermes conversation routing requires its own dispatcher and notifier. Generate a plan and verify its installation confirmation summary identifies Hermes, the absolute Hermes CLI path, intended workspace and queue, systemd scheduler, source-bound notification routing, and writes enabled: no (plan only). If any field identifies the wrong platform or destination, stop. Confirm installation only after that review, then run the read-only doctor and disposable smoke:

bash
loop-engineering-hermes-install \