Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a disclosed Jira and Bitbucket workflow helper that previews by default and only performs the expected Jira updates or branch pushes when applied.
Install only if you want an agent to create Jira issues, update assignee/status/sprint fields, and create Bitbucket branches on your behalf. Use low-privilege Jira and Bitbucket API tokens, keep WORKFLOW_CONFIG private, review previews before applying writes, and avoid broad repository or project permissions unless needed.
A second description-behavior mismatch reinforces that the skill's declared combined Jira/Bitbucket functionality may not exist in practice and that reuse semantics may be absent. In security terms, misleading operational claims can cause unsafe automation decisions, especially where users expect no-write reads, idempotent reuse, or controlled branch creation across repositories.
A second description-behavior mismatch reinforces that the skill's declared combined Jira/Bitbucket functionality may not exist in practice and that reuse semantics may be absent. In security terms, misleading operational claims can cause unsafe automation decisions, especially where users expect no-write reads, idempotent reuse, or controlled branch creation across repositories.
The skill invokes local Python helpers and describes operations that require shell, file access, environment/config access, and network access, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This creates an authorization ambiguity where an agent may run broader-capability actions than reviewers or policy expect, increasing the chance of unintended writes to Jira/Bitbucket or misuse of local credentials.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
# Private configuration and usage
Set `WORKFLOW_CONFIG` to a private JSON file outside the public repository. Required issue settings: `jira_url`, `jira_project`, `jira_board_id`, `jira_sprint_field`. Branch work also requires `bitbucket_workspace` and `local_root`, where each clone is stored as `<local_root>/<repository-slug>`. Obtain the sprint field ID and board ID from your own Jira configuration; do not copy illustrative IDs without verification.
Credentials come only from `JIRA_EMAIL`, `JIRA_API_TOKEN`, `BITBUCKET_USERNAME` and `BITBUCKET_API_TOKEN`. Configure these through your usual credential manager. Do not print them or store them in request files. Use the provider's supported API-token authentication and the minimum permissions needed for the requested work.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
workspace = str(workflow_config.required(config, "bitbucket_workspace"))
if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+", workspace):
raise ValueError("Invalid Bitbucket workspace")
BB = "https://api.bitbucket.org/2.0/repositories/" + workspace
LOCAL_ROOT = Path(workflow_config.required(config, "local_root")).expanduser().resolve()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
workspace = str(workflow_config.required(config, "bitbucket_workspace"))
if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+", workspace):
raise ValueError("Invalid Bitbucket workspace")
BB = "https://api.bitbucket.org/2.0/repositories/" + workspace
LOCAL_ROOT = Path(workflow_config.required(config, "local_root")).expanduser().resolve()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
workspace = str(workflow_config.required(config, "bitbucket_workspace"))
if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+", workspace):
raise ValueError("Invalid Bitbucket workspace")
BB = "https://api.bitbucket.org/2.0/repositories/" + workspace
LOCAL_ROOT = Path(workflow_config.required(config, "local_root")).expanduser().resolve()
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
workspace = str(workflow_config.required(config, "bitbucket_workspace"))
if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+", workspace):
raise ValueError("Invalid Bitbucket workspace")
BB = "https://api.bitbucket.org/2.0/repositories/" + workspace
LOCAL_ROOT = Path(workflow_config.required(config, "local_root")).expanduser().resolve()
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
if not repo_dir.is_relative_to(LOCAL_ROOT):
sys.exit("ERROR repository path is outside local_root")
from urllib.parse import urlparse
remote = subprocess.run(["git", "remote", "get-url", "origin"], cwd=repo_dir, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout.strip()
expected = BB.removeprefix("https://api.bitbucket.org/2.0/repositories/") + "/" + r["repo"]
parsed = urlparse(remote if not remote.startswith("git@bitbucket.org:") else remote.replace("git@bitbucket.org:", "ssh://git@bitbucket.org/", 1))
if parsed.hostname != "bitbucket.org" or parsed.path.strip("/").removesuffix(".git") != expected:
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
sys.exit(f"ERROR no local clone at {repo_dir}; a git push is needed for Jira to index the branch")
for cmd in (["git", "fetch", "origin", r["base_hash"]],
["git", "push", "origin", f"{r['base_hash']}:refs/heads/{r['name']}"]):
if subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=repo_dir).returncode:
sys.exit(f"ERROR {' '.join(cmd)} failed in {repo_dir}")
Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.
if bool(a.issue) == bool(a.input):
p.error("Provide either an existing issue key or --input for a new issue.")
for option in ("assignee_account_id", "status"):
value = getattr(a, option)
if value is not None:
if not value.strip():
p.error(f"{option} must not be empty.")
No suspicious patterns detected.