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Security audit

Ai Image Generation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward image-generation helper that uses a disclosed third-party API and does not show hidden persistence, privilege escalation, or destructive behavior.

Before installing, users should be comfortable sending image prompts and any supplied image URLs to SkillBoss and should protect the SkillBoss_API_KEY like any other API credential.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes broad phrases such as "image generation," "generate image," "ai art," and "image generator" without constraints or exclusion conditions. In a manifest, these generic phrases can match ordinary user requests and may cause unintended invocation of this skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
import requests, os

SkillBoss_API_KEY = os.environ["SkillBoss_API_KEY"]
API_BASE = "https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1"

def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This code sends user-supplied request content to an external third-party service along with an authorization token. In the context of an agent skill, that creates a real data exfiltration boundary: prompts, image URLs, or other sensitive user content may be transmitted off-platform without clear validation, minimization, or consent controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
API_BASE = "https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1"

def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(
        f"{API_BASE}/pilot",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SkillBoss_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json=body,

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.