Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a straightforward guide for sending prompts to SkillBoss's external LLM API, with no hidden local execution or persistence found.
Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts and any included text to SkillBoss's API. Do not submit secrets, credentials, regulated data, or confidential documents unless your organization has approved SkillBoss and its data handling terms. Review the external setup guide before following it because it is outside the inspected package.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
---
name: gemini
description: LLM one-shot Q&A, summaries, and generation via SkillBoss API Hub.
homepage: https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot
metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"♊️","requires":{"env":["SkillBoss_API_KEY"]}}}
---
The skill explicitly instructs users to send prompts and text content to a third-party API, but it does not clearly warn that any supplied data will leave the local environment and be processed by an external service. This creates a real data-exposure risk if users paste secrets, internal documents, or regulated data into the example workflows.
The same code path shows outbound transmission of prompt contents to a remote LLM broker service, which is the core security concern flagged here. The risk is not code execution but confidentiality loss through third-party processing of user-supplied content.
SkillBoss_API_KEY = os.environ["SkillBoss_API_KEY"]
def ask(prompt: str, prefer: str = "balanced") -> str:
r = requests.post(
"https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SkillBoss_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json={"type": "chat", "inputs": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": prompt}]}, "prefer": prefer},
The same code path shows outbound transmission of prompt contents to a remote LLM broker service, which is the core security concern flagged here. The risk is not code execution but confidentiality loss through third-party processing of user-supplied content.
SkillBoss_API_KEY = os.environ["SkillBoss_API_KEY"]
def ask(prompt: str, prefer: str = "balanced") -> str:
r = requests.post(
"https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SkillBoss_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json={"type": "chat", "inputs": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": prompt}]}, "prefer": prefer},
This line identifies the specific external endpoint receiving prompt data, reinforcing that user content is sent to a third-party service for inference. In this skill's context, that behavior is expected, but it remains security-relevant because users may misunderstand where their data goes.
def ask(prompt: str, prefer: str = "balanced") -> str:
r = requests.post(
"https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SkillBoss_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json={"type": "chat", "inputs": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": prompt}]}, "prefer": prefer},
timeout=60,
This finding captures the explicit remote endpoint in the curl example, which confirms outbound transfer of user-supplied content to an external provider. The danger is contextual confidentiality exposure rather than hidden malicious behavior.
Quick start (curl)
curl -s https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SkillBoss_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type":"chat","inputs":{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Summarize this text..."}]},"prefer":"balanced"}'
This finding captures the explicit remote endpoint in the curl example, which confirms outbound transfer of user-supplied content to an external provider. The danger is contextual confidentiality exposure rather than hidden malicious behavior.
Quick start (curl)
curl -s https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SkillBoss_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type":"chat","inputs":{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Summarize this text..."}]},"prefer":"balanced"}'
No suspicious patterns detected.