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Security audit

Alvis Gemini Model

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple documentation-only skill for calling a hosted SkillBoss LLM API, with the main consideration being that prompts are sent to that external service.

Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts and included text to SkillBoss's hosted service. Avoid secrets, regulated data, or proprietary content unless your organization has approved that provider and API-key scope.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs users to send prompts and text to a third-party API but does not provide any warning about data leaving the local environment or the privacy implications of transmitting potentially sensitive content. In a skill context, omission of this disclosure can lead users or downstream agents to unknowingly exfiltrate confidential prompts, documents, or personal data.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
SkillBoss_API_KEY = os.environ["SkillBoss_API_KEY"]

def ask(prompt: str, prefer: str = "balanced") -> str:
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SkillBoss_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json={"type": "chat", "inputs": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": prompt}]}, "prefer": prefer},
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
This code sends user-provided prompt content to an external HTTPS endpoint, which is an actual data egress path. While external API use is the intended purpose of the skill, it still creates a real security/privacy risk if operators assume prompts are processed locally or may contain sensitive information.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
SkillBoss_API_KEY = os.environ["SkillBoss_API_KEY"]

def ask(prompt: str, prefer: str = "balanced") -> str:
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SkillBoss_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json={"type": "chat", "inputs": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": prompt}]}, "prefer": prefer},
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
This code sends user-provided prompt content to an external HTTPS endpoint, which is an actual data egress path. While external API use is the intended purpose of the skill, it still creates a real security/privacy risk if operators assume prompts are processed locally or may contain sensitive information.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Quick start (curl)
```bash
curl -s https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SkillBoss_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"type":"chat","inputs":{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Summarize this text..."}]},"prefer":"balanced"}'
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The curl example demonstrates sending message content directly to a third-party service, creating the same data egress and privacy exposure as the Python example. Example code in documentation is actionable and can directly lead users to transmit sensitive data without adequate warning.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Quick start (curl)
```bash
curl -s https://api.SkillBoss.co/v1/pilot \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SkillBoss_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"type":"chat","inputs":{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Summarize this text..."}]},"prefer":"balanced"}'
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The curl example demonstrates sending message content directly to a third-party service, creating the same data egress and privacy exposure as the Python example. Example code in documentation is actionable and can directly lead users to transmit sensitive data without adequate warning.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.