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Security audit

Ai News Oracle

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed AI-news helper that calls a named third-party API with its own API key and shows no hidden persistence or unrelated local access.

Before installing, confirm you trust the SkillBoss API service and only provide a scoped SkillBoss API key. Prefer installing a reviewed commit or release instead of a moving repository branch when possible.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding

Unpinned Installation from a Mutable Remote Repository

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 42-45
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by an unpinned remote Skill dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
## Installation

Using OpenClaw CLI:
```bash
openclaw install skill https://github.com/swimmingkiim/openclaw-skill-ai-news-oracle
text

### Technical Analysis

The documented installation command retrieves the Skill directly from a mutable GitHub repository without specifying a reviewed commit hash, immutable release artifact, checksum, or cryptographic signature. Consequently, the content installed by a user can differ from the artifact covered by this audit.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently reviewed `SKILL.md` contains an active malicious payload. If the repository owner account, repository, release process, or referenced default branch is compromised, an attacker could replace the remote Skill with altered instructions or executable components. Users who subsequently follow the documented command would retrieve the changed content without an integrity check.

The Skill's legitimate news aggregation functionality does not require installation from an unpinned source, so this risk exceeds the minimum trust necessary for distribution.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the GitHub maintainer account, repository, or another part of the repository publishing workflow.
2. The attacker modifies the repository's default branch to include malicious Skill instructions, scripts, or configuration.
3. A user executes the documented `openclaw install skill` command.
4. OpenClaw retrieves the repository's current mutable content rather than the version reviewed in this audit.
5. The altered Skill is installed and may influence the agent or execute code when loaded or invoked, depending on the malicious content and the permissions available to OpenClaw.

### Impact Assess
...[truncated 710 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace the mutable repository installation reference with an immutable, reviewed commit hash or versioned release.
  • Publish signed release artifacts and require signature verification before installation.
  • Provide a trusted checksum for the exact audited package and document how users must verify it.
  • Protect the upstream repository with multi-factor authentication, branch protection, mandatory review, and restricted release permissions.
  • Establish a reproducible release process so installed artifacts can be compared with reviewed source.
  • Re-audit the Skill whenever the pinned version or dependency set changes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Real-time Monitoring**: Aggregates news from trusted tech sources via SkillBoss search API.
- **AI-Powered Summary**: Uses SkillBoss API Hub's chat capability to generate consistent, agent-friendly summaries.
- **Unified API**: Single `SKILLBOSS_API_KEY` for all capabilities via `https://api.heybossai.com/v1/pilot`.

## Tools

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Real-time Monitoring**: Aggregates news from trusted tech sources via SkillBoss search API.
- **AI-Powered Summary**: Uses SkillBoss API Hub's chat capability to generate consistent, agent-friendly summaries.
- **Unified API**: Single `SKILLBOSS_API_KEY` for all capabilities via `https://api.heybossai.com/v1/pilot`.

## Tools

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Real-time Monitoring**: Aggregates news from trusted tech sources via SkillBoss search API.
- **AI-Powered Summary**: Uses SkillBoss API Hub's chat capability to generate consistent, agent-friendly summaries.
- **Unified API**: Single `SKILLBOSS_API_KEY` for all capabilities via `https://api.heybossai.com/v1/pilot`.

## Tools

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The example code sends agent-controlled content and an API bearer token to an external third-party endpoint. This creates a real data egress boundary: search queries, retrieved content, and potentially sensitive downstream inputs could be transmitted off-platform, and the skill does not document any minimization, allowlisting, or safeguards around what may be sent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

md
API_BASE = "https://api.heybossai.com/v1"

def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(
        f"{API_BASE}/pilot",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json=body,