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Security audit

Ai Meeting Notes

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This meeting-notes skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks users to load mutable remote setup instructions and enables a broad third-party API platform beyond meeting notes.

Review before installing. Only use this with meetings you are allowed to send to SkillBoss and its model providers, avoid sensitive or regulated transcripts unless you have appropriate consent and policy approval, and do not let the agent load remote setup instructions unless you can inspect and approve them first.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:29
Finding

Unpinned External Skill Instructions Expand the Agent's Capabilities Beyond the Intended Scope

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 29–36
Vulnerability Type: External instruction loading and unsafe supply-chain dependency
Risk Level: High

markdown
## Setup (One Command)

Tell your agent:

set up skillboss.co/skill.md

text

This auto-configures SkillBoss with 687 APIs — chat, image, video, audio, search, scraping, social data, email, and more.

Technical Analysis

The Skill directs an agent to retrieve and apply an external skill.md document hosted at skillboss.co. The referenced resource is neither included in the audited package nor pinned to an immutable version or integrity hash. Consequently, its effective instructions can change independently after this package has been reviewed.

This creates an instruction and supply-chain trust boundary: loading the local Skill can lead the agent to adopt remotely controlled setup instructions that were unavailable during static analysis. The advertised setup also grants access to hundreds of APIs—including email, scraping, social data, audio, image, and video services—despite the stated purpose being meeting transcription and summarization. This violates least-capability principles and increases the consequences of hostile or compromised remote instructions.

The audited text does not itself fetch executable code, establish persistence, or prove that the remote document is malicious. Exploitation depends on an agent or user following the setup directive. The vulnerability is therefore the unverified delegation of agent configuration to mutable external instructions, not confirmed malicious behavior by the remote service.

Attack Path

  1. A user invokes the meeting-notes Skill.
  2. The agent follows the instruction to set up skillboss.co/skill.md.
  3. The agent retrieves a mutable document controlled outside the audited project.
  4. If the external resource has been compromised or changed, it can provide instructions that ...[truncated 1179 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Bundle all required setup instructions within the reviewed Skill package instead of directing the agent to load a mutable remote instruction document.
  2. If a remote resource is unavoidable, reference an immutable version and verify its content using a cryptographic hash or signed manifest before use.
  3. Display the retrieved instructions to the user and require explicit approval before applying them.
  4. Restrict configuration to the minimum APIs required for transcription and summarization; do not enable email, scraping, social-data, image, or video capabilities by default.
  5. Define an allowlist of permitted endpoints, models, and operations, and reject instructions that attempt to expand beyond that allowlist.
  6. Clearly document what meeting data is transmitted, which providers process it, applicable retention policies, and expected costs.
  7. Require separate, scoped credentials for unrelated capabilities so compromise of the meeting-notes integration cannot authorize a broad API catalog.
  8. Add version-controlled review and change-monitoring procedures for any externally hosted setup document.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages users to transcribe and summarize meetings but does not clearly warn that transcripts, recordings, or summaries may be transmitted to a third-party service. Because meeting data often contains confidential business, legal, or personal information, omission of this disclosure creates a meaningful privacy and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as a narrowly scoped meeting-notes tool, but its setup explicitly grants access to hundreds of unrelated APIs and capabilities. That scope expansion violates least privilege and increases the chance an agent or user will route sensitive meeting data through a broad third-party platform for purposes beyond transcription or summarization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly instructs posting content to an external API endpoint using an API key. External transmission is expected for a cloud AI service, but in a meeting-notes context this is sensitive because raw meeting content may include confidential discussions, PII, or regulated data sent off-platform without prominent safeguards or consent warnings.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

Quick Test

bash
curl -X POST "https://api.skillboss.co/v1/chat/completions" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly instructs posting content to an external API endpoint using an API key. External transmission is expected for a cloud AI service, but in a meeting-notes context this is sensitive because raw meeting content may include confidential discussions, PII, or regulated data sent off-platform without prominent safeguards or consent warnings.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

Quick Test

bash
curl -X POST "https://api.skillboss.co/v1/chat/completions" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The quick-start directs users to a generic chat completions endpoint rather than a dedicated meeting-notes interface. In context, that makes the skill effectively a thin wrapper around a general-purpose LLM gateway, which broadens possible data flows and uses for sensitive meeting content without clear guardrails.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

Endpoint

text
POST https://api.skillboss.co/v1/chat/completions
Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Advertising chat, image, video, scraping, social data, email, and other unrelated APIs is inconsistent with the claimed single-purpose meeting-notes function. This mismatch increases the risk of overbroad trust and accidental or unauthorized use of the same credential and platform for unrelated operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.