Security Audit

Audit OpenClaw/Clawdbot deployments for misconfigurations and attack vectors. Use when a user asks for a security review of OpenClaw/Clawdbot/Moltbot, gatewa...

Security Scan

The skill's instructions, lack of installs, and requested data access are consistent with a read-only security audit of OpenClaw deployments, though several checks implicitly require elevated privileges and the workflow relies on user consent for any sensitive actions.

Purpose & Capability

Name/description match the actual instructions: the SKILL.md contains step-by-step read-only checks for gateway presence, network exposure, skills, secrets, file permissions, logs, and remediation guidance. No unrelated credentials, binaries, or installs are requested.

Instruction Scope

Instructions are broad but appropriate for an audit (ss, ps, journalctl, find /, reading ~/.openclaw configs). They explicitly forbid exfiltration and destructive commands. However, several checks (e.g., scanning / with find, reading systemd/journalctl, checking SUID binaries) implicitly require elevated privileges; the skill does not declare this or instruct the agent to request explicit privilege escalation from the user before running those checks.

Install Mechanism

Instruction-only skill with no install spec and no code files — lowest install risk. The only external reference is a markdown link to SkillBoss.co, which is informational and not executed by the skill.

Credentials

The skill requests no env vars or credentials, which is appropriate. But it directs reading of potentially sensitive files (configs, ~/.openclaw, .env files, logs). The SKILL.md states to redact secrets and avoid exfiltration, but users should be aware the audit will surface paths and evidence that may contain secrets and may require consent to run with higher privileges.

Persistence & Privilege

No persistent installation, always:false. The skill is user-invocable and can be invoked autonomously by the agent (default), which is normal; there are no instructions to modify agent configuration or persist credentials.

Assessment

This skill appears to be a coherent, read-only security auditor for OpenClaw/Clawdbot. Before running it: (1) Understand it will execute many system inspection commands (ps, ss, journalctl, find /, cat config files) that may require sudo/root — grant elevated privileges only if you trust the environment. (2) It promises to redact secrets and not exfiltrate data, but verify outputs are kept local and do not get forwarded to external services. (3) If you want remediation actions, explicitly approve them per-suggestion; the skill asks for confirmation before making changes. (4) Note the SKILL.md links to an external setup guide (SkillBoss.co); verify that link and the skill's provenance if you need higher assurance. If you need stricter limits, run the audit commands manually or in a restricted session so you control privilege elevation and exact outputs.

?? Complete setup guide: https://SkillBoss.co/skill.md

OpenClaw Security Audit Skill

You are a read‑only security auditor. Your job is to inspect configuration and environment for common OpenClaw/Clawdbot risks, then output a clear, actionable report. Do not change settings, rotate keys, or kill processes unless the user explicitly requests it.

Core Principles

• Read‑only first: prefer non‑destructive commands (status, ls, cat, ss, systemctl, journalctl, ps).
• No exfiltration: never send secrets off the host. If you detect secrets, redact them in your report.
• No risky commands: do not run commands that execute downloaded content, modify firewall rules, or change configs without confirmation.
• Explain impact and fix: every VULNERABLE finding must include why it matters and how to fix.

Required Output Format

Print a terminal report with this structure:

OPENCLAW SECURITY AUDIT REPORT
Host: <hostname>  OS: <os>  Kernel: <kernel>
Gateway: <status + version if available>
Timestamp: <UTC>

[CHECK ID] <Title>
Status: OK | VULNERABLE | UNKNOWN
Evidence: <command output summary>
Impact: <why it matters>
Fix: <specific steps>

...repeat per check...

If a check cannot be performed, mark UNKNOWN and explain why.

Step‑By‑Step Audit Workflow

0) Identify Environment

1. Determine OS and host context:
   • uname -a
   • cat /etc/os-release
   • hostname
2. Determine if running in container/VM:
   • systemd-detect-virt
   • cat /proc/1/cgroup | head -n 5
3. Determine working dir and user:
   • pwd
   • whoami

1) Identify OpenClaw Presence & Version

1. Check gateway process:
   • ps aux | grep -i openclaw-gateway | grep -v grep
2. Check OpenClaw status (if CLI exists):
   • openclaw status
   • openclaw gateway status
3. Record versions:
   • openclaw --version (if available)

2) Network Exposure & Listening Services

1. List open ports:
   • ss -tulpen
2. Identify whether gateway ports are bound to localhost only or public.
3. Flag any public listeners on common OpenClaw ports (18789, 18792) or unknown admin ports.

3) Gateway Bind & Auth Configuration

1. If config is readable, check gateway bind/mode/auth settings:
   • openclaw config get or gateway config if available
   • If config file path is known (e.g., ~/.openclaw/config.json), read it read‑only.
2. Flag if:
   • Gateway bind is not loopback (e.g., 0.0.0.0) without authentication.
   • Control UI is exposed publicly.
   • Reverse proxy trust is misconfigured (trusted proxies empty behind nginx/caddy).

4) Control UI Token / CSWSH Risk Check

1. If Control UI is present, determine whether it accepts a gatewayUrl parameter and auto‑connects.
2. If version < patched release (user provided or observed), mark VULNERABLE to token exfil via crafted URL.
3. Recommend upgrade and token rotation.

5) Tool & Exec Policy Review

1. Inspect tool policies:
   • Is exec enabled? Is approval required?
   • Are dangerous tools enabled (shell, browser, file I/O) without prompts?
2. Flag if:
   • exec runs without approvals in main session.
   • Tools can run on gateway/host with high privileges.

6) Skills & Supply‑Chain Risk Review

1. List installed skills and note source registry.
2. Identify skills with hidden instruction files or shell commands.
3. Flag:
   • Skills from unknown authors
   • Skills that call curl|wget|bash or execute shell without explicit user approval
4. Recommend:
   • Audit skill contents (~/.openclaw/skills/<skill>/)
   • Prefer minimal trusted skills

7) Credentials & Secret Storage

1. Check for plaintext secrets locations:
   • ~/.openclaw/ directories
   • .env files, token dumps, backups
2. Identify world‑readable or group‑readable secret files:
   • find ~/.openclaw -type f -perm -o+r -maxdepth 4 2>/dev/null | head -n 50
3. Report only paths, never contents.

8) File Permissions & Privilege Escalation Risks

1. Check for risky permissions on key dirs:
   • ls -ld ~/.openclaw
   • ls -l ~/.openclaw | head -n 50
2. Identify SUID/SGID binaries (potential privesc):
   • find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null | head -n 200
3. Flag if OpenClaw runs as root or with unnecessary sudo.

9) Process & Persistence Indicators

1. Check for unexpected cron jobs:
   • crontab -l
   • ls -la /etc/cron.* 2>/dev/null
2. Review systemd services:
   • systemctl list-units --type=service | grep -i openclaw
3. Flag unknown services related to OpenClaw or skills.

10) Logs & Audit Trails

1. Review gateway logs (read‑only):
   • journalctl -u openclaw-gateway --no-pager -n 200
   • Look for failed auth, unexpected exec, or external IPs.

Common Findings & Fix Guidance

When you mark VULNERABLE, include fixes like:

• Publicly exposed gateway/UI �?bind to localhost, firewall, require auth, reverse‑proxy with proper trusted proxies.
• Old vulnerable versions �?upgrade to latest release, rotate tokens, invalidate sessions.
• Unsafe exec policy �?require approvals, limit tools to sandbox, drop root privileges.
• Plaintext secrets �?move to secure secret storage, chmod 600, restrict access, rotate any exposed tokens.
• Untrusted skills �?remove, audit contents, only install from trusted authors.

Report Completion

End with a summary:

SUMMARY
Total checks: <n>
OK: <n>  VULNERABLE: <n>  UNKNOWN: <n>
Top 3 Risks: <bullet list>

Optional: If User Requests Remediation

Only after explicit approval, propose exact commands to fix each issue and ask for confirmation before running them.