T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:140- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Is Downloaded and Executed Automatically
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a website-cloning guide with disclosed local-copy behavior, but it includes attribution replacement, unsafe shell examples, and unpinned remote package execution that need human review before use.
Install only if you will use it for sites you own or have permission to copy. Before running it, pin or preinstall any browser automation dependency instead of using @latest, validate and quote target URLs, run in a limited workspace without secrets, and preserve attribution unless you are authorized to change it.
SKILL.md:140Unpinned Third-Party Package Is Downloaded and Executed Automatically
SKILL.md:62Unquoted User-Supplied URL Can Enable Shell Command Injection
The skill encourages cloning arbitrary websites and includes attribution-rewriting behavior without any warning about authorization, copyright, trademark, or ownership constraints. In context, this omission materially increases misuse risk because the workflow is framed as a straightforward method to recreate and rebrand third-party sites.
The skill explicitly instructs users to replace the original author's name and external profile links after cloning a site. That goes beyond technical mirroring and facilitates impersonation, plagiarism, and deceptive redistribution of third-party content under altered identity.
The skill's natural-language instructions, headings, triggers, and examples are all in Chinese, effectively forcing a specific language for use and interpretation. There is no opt-in, alternative language, or stated regional justification for this locale constraint.
The procedure downloads multiple remote resources via curl and writes them into a local directory structure, but the markdown does not prominently disclose this data transfer and local storage behavior as a user warning. Because the skill operates on arbitrary websites and recursively pulls assets, users should be warned that content and metadata from remote systems will be copied onto their machine.
The skill's purpose is local website cloning, but Step 6 adds execution of npx ... agent-browser@latest and optional vision-model analysis. With no manifest scoping available, these extra capabilities introduce remote package execution and AI-based inspection that are not inherent to producing a local mirror.
The skill instructs users to run npx -y agent-browser@latest, which fetches and executes the latest package version at runtime without pinning or integrity verification. This creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised upstream release or dependency could execute arbitrary code on the user's machine during validation steps.
This invocation again relies on npx -y agent-browser@latest, causing unpinned remote code execution as part of the workflow. Because the skill positions this as a normal verification step, it increases the chance users will run arbitrary updated code without review.
The command fetches and runs the latest agent-browser package directly from npm, exposing the user to package takeover, malicious updates, or dependency compromise. Repeating the pattern across multiple commands normalizes insecure execution and broadens the attack surface.
The tooling section recommends npx -y agent-browser@latest as the installation method, embedding an insecure supply-chain practice into the skill itself. Users following the documented setup may unknowingly execute arbitrary upstream code outside any pinned or audited environment.
The manifest display name includes Chinese text ("网站1:1本地复刻") alongside English, but there is no indication that the skill is bilingual by user choice or limited to a Chinese-language audience. This can violate language/locale policy expectations when a skill implicitly imposes or assumes a language without opt-in or documented scope.
No suspicious patterns detected.