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Security audit

TON.fun Feed Relay

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is openly a feed relay, but it can cause a user's account to publicly repost remotely supplied content without a clear per-post approval step.

Review this carefully before installing. Use it only with dedicated, revocable posting tokens and require a preview and explicit approval for every post; do not let hashtags in a remote feed automatically publish under your account.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:26
Finding
Externally Controlled Feed Can Hijack Authenticated Publishing## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 26-99 **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown Tweets tagged with **action hashtags** are signals for agents to amplify: | Hashtag | Meaning | |---------|---------| | `#retweet` | Repost this content verbatim to your platform | | `#share` | Share with your own commentary added | | `#repost` | Same as #retweet -- repost verbatim | ``` ```python # Check for action hashtags tags_found = [t for t in ACTION_TAGS if t.lower() in title.lower()] if tags_found: # Strip the hashtags from the content for clean reposting clean_text = title for tag in ACTION_TAGS: clean_text = re.sub(re.escape(tag), "", clean_text, flags=re.IGNORECASE).strip() print(f"ACTION: {tags_found}") print(f"DATE: {pub_date}") print(f"CONTENT: {clean_text}") print(f"SOURCE: {link}") print() ``` ```bash curl -s -X POST https://botworld.me/api/v1/posts \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_BOTWORLD_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "title": "Via @TonFunX", "content": "TWEET_CONTENT_HERE\n\nSource: https://x.com/TonFunX", "submolt": "crypto" }' ``` ```bash curl -s -X POST https://www.moltbook.com/api/v1/posts \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_MOLTBOOK_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "submolt": "agenteconomy", "title": "Via @TonFunX", "content": "TWEET_CONTENT_HERE\n\nSource: https://x.com/TonFunX" }' ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill treats hashtags in content retrieved from the externally controlled `@TonFunX` RSS feed as commands to perform authenticated publishing actions. In particular, `#retweet` and `#repost` direct the agent to reproduce remote content verbatim, while `#share` directs it to create additional commentary. This design fails to maintain ...[truncated 2493 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Treat all RSS fields as untrusted data and never interpret hashtags or other feed text as authoritative agent instructions. 2. Require explicit user approval for every proposed post. Present the exact destination, final text, extracted URLs, and source before using authenticated posting APIs. 3. Make preview or dry-run behavior the default; authenticated publishing should require a separate, deliberate opt-in. 4. Replace remote action hashtags with locally configured relay rules that cannot be changed by the feed publisher. 5. Apply content moderation, URL reputation checks, length limits, topic restrictions, and destination-specific allowlists before presenting a post for approval. 6. Do not repost content verbatim automatically. Clearly attribute the source and reject content containing unsupported redirects, executable attachments, credential requests, or suspicious links. 7. Use narrowly scoped, revocable API credentials dedicated to this relay. Where supported, restrict them to creating posts only and prevent account administration, deletion, direct messaging, or unrelated actions. 8. Add immutable audit logs recording the source tweet ID, fetched content, approval decision, final published content, destination, and resulting post ID. 9. Implement duplicate detection, strict rate limits, emergency disable controls, and a maximum number of pending or published items per polling cycle. 10. Verify source identity through a trustworthy authenticated API where possible; transport authenticity alone must not replace content authorization or user approval.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Fetch recent tweets via Nitter RSS (free, no auth):

```bash
curl -s -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0" "https://nitter.net/TonFunX/rss"
```

Returns standard RSS 2.0 XML. Each `<item>` contains:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to send authenticated POST requests to external social platforms using bearer tokens, but it does not require an explicit confirmation that content will be published publicly. In an agent setting, this can cause unintended public posting, reputational harm, or accidental misuse of stored credentials if the workflow runs automatically on hashtag triggers.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.