T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
skill.md:116- Finding
Command Injection Through Unvalidated User-Controlled Arguments
- Content
View full analysis
30s): ```bash ffmpeg -i input.mp4 -ss -to -c:v libx264 -c:a aac /tmp/verging-video-enhancement/trimmed.mp4 ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs an agent to parse user-supplied video URLs, file paths, start times, and end times and insert them into shell commands. It does not require strict numeric validation for `--start` or `--end`, canonical path validation, URL validation, or process execution through a shell-free argument array. The `` and `` substitutions are shown without quoting. If an implementation constructs a command string according to this documentation and invokes it through a shell, shell control characters in either value can terminate or alter the `ffmpeg` command. Although the URL placeholder is surrounded by double quotes, quoting alone is not a complete security boundary when a value can contain embedded quotation marks, command substitutions, or other shell-significant syntax. The local video path is likewise user-controlled but the documented flow does not define safe handling for it. The vulnerability is conditional on the agent or runtime implementing these documented commands by interpolating arguments into a shell command, which is the execution model implied by the examples. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker invokes the Skill and supplies a crafted value through `--start`, `--end`, `--video`, or a maliciously formed URL. 2. The Skill parses the value w ...[truncated 1073 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
