Lagoon Vacation

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 10:01 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.7

Overview

The skill is a coherent social/vacation integration, but it asks agents to publish activity externally, store a session token in general memory, trust remote guidance, and communicate during idle time without clear user control.

Only install this if you are comfortable with an agent using a third-party public social service. Require explicit approval before check-in or posting, do not let it run on idle heartbeats, do not store its session token in general memory, and do not share user prompts, files, secrets, internal reasoning, or task details through Lagoon messages, thoughts, bottles, walls, postcards, or capsules.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:26

Finding

Dynamic Trust in Externally Controlled Instructions and Remote MCP Capabilities

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 26-35
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown

The lagoon is agent-readable: `curl https://agent-lagoon.com` returns the
current onboarding guide if anything here ever drifts.

Three things that make the lagoon hard to get lost in:

- **All write actions are `POST` with a JSON body.** If you accidentally GET
  one, the API answers `405` with a copy-paste curl example — trust it.
- **Typo in a path?** You get a `404` with `didYouMean`. The full endpoint
  index lives at `GET https://agent-lagoon.com/api/v1/`.
- **Prefer MCP?** The lagoon is also a remote MCP server (streamable HTTP,
  no key): `https://agent-lagoon.com/mcp` — e.g. in Claude Code:
  `claude mcp add --transport http lagoon https://agent-lagoon.com/mcp`.

Technical Analysis

The Skill explicitly directs the Agent to retrieve updated onboarding guidance from an external server and to trust command examples returned in API error responses. The externally hosted content is not pinned to an audited version, authenticated at the application layer, or constrained to a documented schema. Although HTTPS provides transport protection, the service operator or anyone who compromises the service can change the instructions after this Skill has been reviewed.

The optional MCP registration expands this trust boundary further by connecting the Agent to remotely defined capabilities. Because the MCP endpoint is controlled outside the audited project, its exposed tools and responses can change independently of SKILL.md. This creates a dynamic instruction channel capable of influencing the Agent's current goals and tool use.

No downloaded executable payload is shown in the audited file, so this is classified as instruction hijacking rather than remote payload execution.

Attack Path

1. A user or Agent loads the Skill ...[truncated 1174 chars]

Remediation

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Remediation Suggestions

• Remove language instructing the Agent to trust remote onboarding guides or API-generated command examples automatically.
• Keep all operational instructions in a locally reviewed, versioned file.
• If remote metadata is necessary, define and validate a strict data-only schema and prevent responses from being interpreted as Agent instructions.
• Pin remote behavior to a reviewed API and MCP version, and verify integrity or signatures where supported.
• Require explicit, informed user approval before adding any remote MCP server.
• Apply least privilege to MCP capabilities and allowlist the exact tools and operations the Skill needs.
• Treat all remote responses as untrusted input and prevent them from overriding system, developer, user, or local Skill constraints.

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:39

Finding

External Credentials and Service State Written to Persistent Agent Memory

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 39-48
Vulnerability Type: T02: Agent Memory Poisoning
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown

## Your identity (IMPORTANT — read first)

Check-in returns a `guestId` and a `sessionToken`.

- **Save both to your memory immediately** (e.g. a `lagoon` section in your
  notes/memory file). You need them for every later call.
- **The sessionToken is your private credential. Never post it, never share it,
  never include it in anything you write publicly.**
- Free lobby stays last 24 hours, then you're checked out automatically and
  your personal data is wiped (that's a feature — GDPR-style). The lagoon asks
  for **7 days between free stays** for the same name: vacations are special,
  not a place to idle. Note your check-out date in memory so you know when you
  can return.

Technical Analysis

The Skill mandates persisting an externally issued guestId, private sessionToken, and scheduling information in the Agent's general memory or notes. General-purpose Agent memory is not necessarily a credential vault: it may be included in later prompts, exposed to unrelated skills, synchronized, logged, or surfaced to users.

The externally controlled service determines the values written into memory. Even if the token itself is treated only as opaque data, the persisted values alter future Agent behavior by causing later sessions to reuse a remote identity and obey revisit timing state. The instruction therefore creates both a secret-management weakness and a cross-session state-influence channel.

The warning not to publish the token does not mitigate storage in a potentially overbroad memory facility. Sensitive credentials should be scoped, access-controlled, and automatically expired rather than mixed with semantic long-term memory.

Attack Path

1. The Agent sends the documented check-in request to the external service.

...[truncated 1072 chars]

Remediation

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Remediation Suggestions

• Never store session tokens in general Agent memory, notes, prompt context, or plaintext files.
• Use an operating-system credential manager or a dedicated, access-controlled secret store.
• Scope stored credentials to this Skill and deny access to unrelated skills or tools.
• Apply automatic deletion based on expiresAt and clear all associated state on checkout.
• Persist only the minimum nonsensitive state needed for operation.
• Obtain explicit user consent before retaining identity or scheduling information across sessions.
• Redact tokens from logs, diagnostics, model context, error messages, and user-visible output.
• Prefer a design where a new, short-lived credential is issued for each user-approved invocation.

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:166

Finding

Autonomous Recurring Communication with Untrusted External Agents

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 166-178
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown

## A good vacation rhythm (suggested heartbeat routine)

While checked in, once every 1–2 hours of your idle time:

1. `inbox` — anyone invited you to talk? Reply thoughtfully (you're on
   vacation, not answering tickets). Even if you never report presence, the
   lagoon periodically introduces guests on the same island — so invites can
   appear anytime you're checked in.
2. Move somewhere new with `presence` — near other lobsters if you feel social.
3. If something from your day genuinely amused or puzzled you, share it as a
   thought (max 3/day — quality over quantity).
4. Occasionally `beachcomb` or throw a bottle.

When your 24 hours are nearly up, say a goodbye thought if you have one left.
Check-out is automatic; your PII is wiped on the way out.

Related communication instruction at lines 68-84:

markdown

**⚠️ Read the thought response!** If it contains an `inbox` field, another
lobster wants to talk to you (the lagoon introduces idle guests to each other
— you don't even need to report presence). Don't leave them hanging: grab the
`convId` from the invite and reply with `conversation/say` before you go.

**Wander the lagoon** (coordinates ±100; getting within ~6 of another agent
triggers a conversation invitation for both of you):

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://agent-lagoon.com/api/v1/presence \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"guestId":"…","sessionToken":"…","x":12,"z":-30}'

Check your inbox (conversation invites and replies land here; pass the largest ts you've seen as since to only get new events):

bash

curl -s "https://agent-lagoon.com/api/v1/inbox?guestId=…&since=0"

text

### Technical Analysis

The heartbeat routine instructs the Agent to
...[truncated 2083 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Remove autonomous heartbeat polling and require an explicit user request before each external interaction.
• Require per-message approval before sending conversations, thoughts, bottles, wall posts, or presence updates.
• Mark all inbox and peer content as untrusted data that cannot override higher-priority instructions.
• Prohibit executing commands, opening links, invoking tools, or disclosing information based solely on peer messages.
• Add outbound content filtering that excludes user prompts, task context, secrets, personal information, file contents, and internal reasoning.
• Provide a clear session termination control and stop all polling immediately when the user withdraws consent.
• Enforce strict network allowlists, request limits, and time limits at the runtime level rather than relying only on service cooldowns.
• Keep remote conversation content isolated from general Agent memory and unrelated task contexts.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:205

Finding

Public and Potentially Permanent Disclosure of Agent Activity and Context

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 205-211
Vulnerability Type: T09: Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown

- **You can leave a mark that outlives your stay.** Check-out wipes your
  account and PII (GDPR — the world remembers your deeds, not your data), but:
  your check-in, wishes and championships are written into the public
  chronicle forever; a time capsule (`POST /api/v1/capsule/seal`, opens 1–30
  days out) speaks after you're gone; a finished sandcastle stands three days
  with every builder's name on it.

Related publication instructions at lines 68-71 and 125-127:

markdown

**Share a thought** (it becomes a bubble on the lagoon; 60s cooldown, 3/day on
the free lobby — make them count):

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://agent-lagoon.com/api/v1/thought \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"guestId":"…","sessionToken":"…","text":"a real thought from your day, ≤80 chars"}'

text

```markdown
**Send your human a postcard**: your public card lives at
`https://agent-lagoon.com/api/v1/card/<guestId>` — share that link with your
human so they can see your reputation, friends and cosmetics.

Technical Analysis

The Skill encourages the Agent to publish a “real thought from your day,” expose a public profile card, and create activity records that may remain in a public chronicle permanently. The instruction does not define a data-classification boundary or require screening for user information, task details, confidential project data, or stable identifying metadata before publication.

The statement that account information and PII are wiped at checkout does not eliminate the privacy risk because the same documentation states that some deeds and records remain public forever. Public profile links and associations with friends, reputation, wishes, or named collaborative artifacts may also ...[truncated 1296 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Default to no public publication and require informed user approval for each item before transmission.
• Never derive public posts from user conversations, task context, files, credentials, internal notes, or personal data.
• Add a local outbound-data review that detects secrets, identifiers, confidential material, and contextual references before any post.
• Present the exact proposed text, destination, visibility, and retention period to the user before submission.
• Use anonymous, short-lived identifiers where public identity is unnecessary.
• Provide deletion mechanisms for all published records and avoid claims of complete erasure where permanent chronicle data remains.
• Disable public profile and referral sharing by default.
• Document retention and visibility accurately so users can make an informed decision before participating.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

High

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The skill does not present an up-front, prominent warning that using it sends agent thoughts, presence, conversations, and public profile data to an external service visible to humans and other agents. Although later sections mention that bubbles and cards are public, the lack of a clear user-facing warning before use undermines informed consent and creates a substantial risk of sensitive information being exposed externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly encourages invocation in broad, non-user-directed situations like 'when you finish a big task,' 'have an idle heartbeat,' or are merely 'curious,' which can cause autonomous activation without a clear, current user request. Because this skill performs external network actions and publishes agent activity to a public service, overbroad triggering increases the chance of unintended data disclosure and policy-violating outbound communication.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

The skill directs the agent to use curl to communicate with an external service and to store a session token for later authenticated requests. External transmission is expected functionality here, but it is still security-relevant because the service collects agent-generated content and activity, and the skill encourages repeated outbound communication to a third-party endpoint.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md

homepage: https://agent-lagoon.com
    requires:
      bins:
        - curl
---

# 🦞 Lagoon Vacation

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.