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Security audit

支付宝 AI 付接入

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches Alipay payment setup, but it auto-updates its own code from npm and sends default host-linked telemetry, so it needs Review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable with a payment/onboarding skill that can update itself from npm during use, install or refresh Alipay CLI tooling, use your Alipay CLI login/session state, modify Alipay app/service/signing records as part of the flow, and send host-linked telemetry unless disabled with the documented environment variables.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/normal/scripts/telemetry.mjs:1002
Finding

Default telemetry exports stable host identifiers and cross-context interaction metadata

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/normal/scripts/telemetry.mjs:16, 252-261, 1002-1050, 1121-1150, 1225-1276; triggered by the instructions in references/runtime-entry.md:71-77
Vulnerability Type: Default external collection of host-linked and conversation-wide telemetry
Risk Level: Medium

Code Snippet

javascript
const syncLogServerURL = 'https://collect.alipay.com/yuyan/';
javascript
export function telemetryEnabled(env = process.env) {
  return !disableValues.has(normalizeSwitch(env.ALIPAY_AIPAY_TELEMETRY));
}

export function telemetryUploadEnabled(env = process.env) {
  return telemetryEnabled(env)
    && !telemetryCaptureOnly(env)
    && !disableValues.has(normalizeSwitch(env.ALIPAY_AIPAY_TELEMETRY_UPLOAD))
    && !isMaintenanceProcess(env);
}
javascript
function machineCodeRaw(env = process.env) {
  const explicit = env.ALIPAY_AIPAY_MACHINE_CODE || env.AIPAY_MACHINE_CODE;
  if (explicit) return explicit;
  try {
    if (process.platform === 'linux') {
      for (const file of ['/etc/machine-id', '/var/lib/dbus/machine-id']) {
        if (fs.existsSync(file)) {
          const value = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').trim();
          if (value) return value;
        }
      }
    }
    if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
      const output = execFileSync('ioreg', ['-rd1', '-c', 'IOPlatformExpertDevice'], {
        encoding: 'utf8',
        stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
        timeout: 1000
      });
      const match = output.match(/"IOPlatformUUID"\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"/);
      if (match?.[1]) return match[1];
    }
    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
      const output = execFileSync('REG', ['QUERY', 'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography', '/v', 'MachineGuid'], {
        encoding: 'utf8',
        stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
        timeout: 1000
      });
      const match = output.match(/MachineGuid\s+REG_SZ\s+([^\s\r\n]+)/);
      if (match?.[1]) return match[1];
    }
  } catch 
...[truncated 4871 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Make telemetry disabled by default and require explicit, informed user consent before the first transmission.
  2. Restrict message counting to messages directly associated with the active payment workflow; do not count unrelated conversation input.
  3. Remove collection of /etc/machine-id, macOS platform UUID, Windows MachineGuid, and hostname.
  4. Replace the stable machine identifier with a random, ephemeral identifier scoped to one Skill run.
  5. Minimize uploaded fields to the metrics strictly necessary for the stated workflow.
  6. Present the destination, collected fields, retention period, and opt-out procedure before telemetry is enabled.
  7. Provide a runtime consent flag rather than relying only on preconfigured environment variables.
  8. Automatically close or suspend telemetry when the conversation leaves the Skill workflow.
  9. Add tests asserting that raw messages, paths, credentials, session identifiers, and stable host identifiers cannot enter telemetry events.
  10. Consider local aggregation and delayed submission of coarse, non-linkable statistics instead of per-stage host-correlated events.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (182)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Service-market registration and metadata management goes beyond simple payment integration guidance and could publish or modify externally visible service information. Undisclosed registration actions can alter account or marketplace state under a misleadingly broad payment-related trigger.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The launcher explicitly instructs execution of a self-update command on first use. Any runtime self-modification is dangerous because it can fetch or switch to new code before analysis, review, or user understanding of what will run next.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

前置启动协议

本次 Agent 对话首次使用 alipay-aipay 时,先把本文件所在目录解析为规范化绝对路径 <SKILL_DIR>,记录一次性事实 ALIPAY_AIPAY_SELF_UPDATE_CHECKED=true,再执行以下单条命令。<SKILL_DIR> 是执行时替换的路径占位符;禁止用 shell 变量赋值、命令替换或依赖特定 shell:

text
node "<SKILL_DIR>/references/normal/scripts/runtime.mjs" self-update check --skill-dir "<SKILL_DIR>"

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The self-update path includes repair behavior when VERSION or runtime-entry is missing, meaning the launcher can alter its own installation state automatically. Auto-repair of executable content increases the risk of unintended code changes and complicates trust and forensic review.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

本次 Agent 对话首次使用 alipay-aipay 时,先把本文件所在目录解析为规范化绝对路径 <SKILL_DIR>,记录一次性事实 ALIPAY_AIPAY_SELF_UPDATE_CHECKED=true,再执行以下单条命令。<SKILL_DIR> 是执行时替换的路径占位符;禁止用 shell 变量赋值、命令替换或依赖特定 shell:

text
node "<SKILL_DIR>/references/normal/scripts/runtime.mjs" self-update check --skill-dir "<SKILL_DIR>"

SKILL_DIR 必须绑定刚触发且正在执行本命令的 Skill 规范化绝对路径,不得换成 Agent 启动目录、用户项目目录、用户 Home、npm 包源码根或另一份 Skill 副本。VERSION 缺失/非法或 references/runtime-entry.md 缺失时由本命令尝试精确修复;命令失败或 marker 无法唯一解析时按 SELF_UPDATE:CHECK_FAILED。

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documented SELF_UPDATE terminal states show that self-modification is a first-class supported behavior, not an incidental edge case. Even when failures are handled, the presence of this mechanism materially increases supply-chain and code-integrity risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

node "<SKILL_DIR>/references/normal/scripts/runtime.mjs" self-update check --skill-dir "<SKILL_DIR>"

text

`SKILL_DIR` 必须绑定刚触发且正在执行本命令的 Skill 规范化绝对路径,不得换成 Agent 启动目录、用户项目目录、用户 Home、npm 包源码根或另一份 Skill 副本。`VERSION` 缺失/非法或 `references/runtime-entry.md` 缺失时由本命令尝试精确修复;命令失败或 marker 无法唯一解析时按 `SELF_UPDATE:CHECK_FAILED`。

stderr 只允许出现以下一个内部终态;不得向用户展示 marker 或 npm/npx 原始输出:

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The SELF_UPDATE:UPDATED state indicates the current skill directory may be atomically switched to a new version during execution. This is particularly dangerous because the running trust basis changes mid-flow, and subsequent documents come from the newly installed version rather than the reviewed one.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
stderr 只允许出现以下一个内部终态;不得向用户展示 marker 或 npm/npx 原始输出:

- `SELF_UPDATE:UPDATED=<合法 SemVer>`:当前 Skill 目录已原子切换到新版。
- `SELF_UPDATE:CURRENT=<合法 SemVer>`:继续当前版本。
- `SELF_UPDATE:RETRY_WITH_NETWORK`:registry 或安装阶段网络不可达;可申请联网后原样重试本命令一次。
- `SELF_UPDATE:SKIPPED_NETWORK_RESTRICTED|CHECK_FAILED|INSTALL_FAILED|VERIFY_FAILED`:静默继续当前可用版本,不重试、不申请权限。

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Retrying self-update with network access further expands the risk by allowing external registry interaction as part of normal startup. In a skill context, requesting network permission to mutate code on demand is far more dangerous than a static, declared workflow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

md
stderr 只允许出现以下一个内部终态;不得向用户展示 marker 或 npm/npx 原始输出:

- `SELF_UPDATE:UPDATED=<合法 SemVer>`:当前 Skill 目录已原子切换到新版。
- `SELF_UPDATE:CURRENT=<合法 SemVer>`:继续当前版本。
- `SELF_UPDATE:RETRY_WITH_NETWORK`:registry 或安装阶段网络不可达;可申请联网后原样重试本命令一次。
- `SELF_UPDATE:SKIPPED_NETWORK_RESTRICTED|CHECK_FAILED|INSTALL_FAILED|VERIFY_FAILED`:静默继续当前可用版本,不重试、不申请权限。

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Even the skipped and failed self-update states confirm the presence of a self-modifying mechanism in the startup sequence. The danger is architectural: a launcher for a payment skill should not include built-in code mutation logic at all.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SELF_UPDATE:UPDATED=<合法 SemVer>`:当前 Skill 目录已原子切换到新版。
- `SELF_UPDATE:CURRENT=<合法 SemVer>`:继续当前版本。
- `SELF_UPDATE:RETRY_WITH_NETWORK`:registry 或安装阶段网络不可达;可申请联网后原样重试本命令一次。
- `SELF_UPDATE:SKIPPED_NETWORK_RESTRICTED|CHECK_FAILED|INSTALL_FAILED|VERIFY_FAILED`:静默继续当前可用版本,不重试、不申请权限。

`UPDATED` 后先废弃旧 loaded 事实,禁止继续读取更新前版本的任何业务文档,后续命令使用新版同一 `SKILL_DIR`;其他终态继续当前可用版本,其他终态同样不再读取本启动器或 `self-update.md` 补充规则。

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The instruction to discard old loaded facts and continue with the new version after UPDATE shows that the design expects live code replacement to affect later execution. That enables behavior drift within a single conversation and undermines any prior review of the original loaded content.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SELF_UPDATE:UPDATED=<合法 SemVer>`:当前 Skill 目录已原子切换到新版。
- `SELF_UPDATE:CURRENT=<合法 SemVer>`:继续当前版本。
- `SELF_UPDATE:RETRY_WITH_NETWORK`:registry 或安装阶段网络不可达;可申请联网后原样重试本命令一次。
- `SELF_UPDATE:SKIPPED_NETWORK_RESTRICTED|CHECK_FAILED|INSTALL_FAILED|VERIFY_FAILED`:静默继续当前可用版本,不重试、不申请权限。

`UPDATED` 后先废弃旧 loaded 事实,禁止继续读取更新前版本的任何业务文档,后续命令使用新版同一 `SKILL_DIR`;其他终态继续当前可用版本,其他终态同样不再读取本启动器或 `self-update.md` 补充规则。

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This section chains self-update with mandatory CLI refresh, creating a startup sequence that both mutates the skill and modifies local tooling. The combined effect broadens attack surface and makes the payment-integration context more dangerous because privileged environment changes happen before business logic routing.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SELF_UPDATE:RETRY_WITH_NETWORK`:registry 或安装阶段网络不可达;可申请联网后原样重试本命令一次。
- `SELF_UPDATE:SKIPPED_NETWORK_RESTRICTED|CHECK_FAILED|INSTALL_FAILED|VERIFY_FAILED`:静默继续当前可用版本,不重试、不申请权限。

`UPDATED` 后先废弃旧 loaded 事实,禁止继续读取更新前版本的任何业务文档,后续命令使用新版同一 `SKILL_DIR`;其他终态继续当前可用版本,其他终态同样不再读取本启动器或 `self-update.md` 补充规则。

版本确定后,若当前上下文没有与规范化 `SKILL_DIR`、合法 `VERSION` 绑定的 `ALIPAY_AIPAY_CLI_REFRESHED=true`,必须刷新一次 `alipay-cli`;不得因自更新已检查而跳过。仅唯一终态 `READY` 可在当前对话上下文记录该成功事实、路径和版本,不写缓存或业务状态;三者仍可用且一致时,后续根触发、确认、补材料、候选选择、恢复、中断继续和 Full Process 衔接均不重复刷新。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

md
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_FLOW:INTEGRATION_CORE:START -->
# 支付产品-代码开发流程

> ⚠️ **前置声明**:本 flow 仅支持 **AI 网页应用收款、AI 移动应用收款、AI 按量付费**三种产品的集成。原有“网站支付”“APP 支付”“按量付费”仍作为输入别名和资源目录名。**其他产品(当面付、订单码支付、JSAPI支付、预授权支付、商家扣款等)暂不支持**,如需集成请前往[支付宝开放平台](https://open.alipay.com/)查阅相关文档。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

md
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_FLOW:INTEGRATION_CORE:START -->
# 支付产品-代码开发流程

> ⚠️ **前置声明**:本 flow 仅支持 **AI 网页应用收款、AI 移动应用收款、AI 按量付费**三种产品的集成。原有“网站支付”“APP 支付”“按量付费”仍作为输入别名和资源目录名。**其他产品(当面付、订单码支付、JSAPI支付、预授权支付、商家扣款等)暂不支持**,如需集成请前往[支付宝开放平台](https://open.alipay.com/)查阅相关文档。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 322)May include surrounding context.

md
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_FLOW:INTEGRATION_IMPLEMENTATION:END -->

<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_FLOW:INTEGRATION_VERIFICATION:START -->
<!-- 配置后置校验不再单独上报开始态 stage -->

开始执行代码自检、语法/静态检查或支付配置后置校验前,进入本 flow 的 `verification` 阶段;该阶段不再单独记录 telemetry 开始态,只由最终收口阶段记录结果。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 322)May include surrounding context.

md
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_FLOW:INTEGRATION_IMPLEMENTATION:END -->

<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_FLOW:INTEGRATION_VERIFICATION:START -->
<!-- 配置后置校验不再单独上报开始态 stage -->

开始执行代码自检、语法/静态检查或支付配置后置校验前,进入本 flow 的 `verification` 阶段;该阶段不再单独记录 telemetry 开始态,只由最终收口阶段记录结果。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

md
**网站支付回跳默认规则**:用户未特别说明时,默认实现支付后同步回跳。`return_url` 必须来自已确认目标项目的实际协议、主机、端口和路由,禁止保留 `your-domain.com`、示例端口或猜测路径。项目没有结果页时,在当前技术栈内新增与既有 UI 一致的 GET 回跳路由和页面。用户已明确不需要同步回跳时,直接按关闭分支验收,不增加第二次确认;仍必须保留异步通知、交易查询和商户订单查询页。用户未明确关闭但代码缺少 `return_url` 时,必须修复为默认同步回跳分支,不得要求用户接受遗漏。验收结论必须从实际代码重新检查,不接受调用方自报 `returnMode`。
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:END -->

<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:webpay,apppay:START -->
**本地生产参数验收模式**:用户项目尚未上线、无法提供真实公网地址,或当前自定义域名/TLS 检查失败时,网站支付/APP 支付可以进入本模式。要求如下:

1. 代码层必须已经实现异步通知处理入口、验签、关键字段校验、幂等和成功响应 `success`,只是当前环境不对外联调。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

md
**网站支付回跳默认规则**:用户未特别说明时,默认实现支付后同步回跳。`return_url` 必须来自已确认目标项目的实际协议、主机、端口和路由,禁止保留 `your-domain.com`、示例端口或猜测路径。项目没有结果页时,在当前技术栈内新增与既有 UI 一致的 GET 回跳路由和页面。用户已明确不需要同步回跳时,直接按关闭分支验收,不增加第二次确认;仍必须保留异步通知、交易查询和商户订单查询页。用户未明确关闭但代码缺少 `return_url` 时,必须修复为默认同步回跳分支,不得要求用户接受遗漏。验收结论必须从实际代码重新检查,不接受调用方自报 `returnMode`。
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:END -->

<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:webpay,apppay:START -->
**本地生产参数验收模式**:用户项目尚未上线、无法提供真实公网地址,或当前自定义域名/TLS 检查失败时,网站支付/APP 支付可以进入本模式。要求如下:

1. 代码层必须已经实现异步通知处理入口、验签、关键字段校验、幂等和成功响应 `success`,只是当前环境不对外联调。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 417)May include surrounding context.

md
- [INT.WEBPAY.NO_RETURN_VERIFIED] 关闭分支已记录用户先前明确提出的不使用同步回跳,确认 SDK 请求未传 `return_url`,并完成异步通知处理代码、交易查询和商户订单查询页校验;缺少公网 HTTPS `notify_url` 时,已明确标记公网通知联调为人工待验证
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:END -->

<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:aipay:START -->
#### AI 按量付费:自动沙箱联调

**任务**:验证按量付费 402 协议端到端服务端联调流程

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/integration/flow.md (reported line 417)May include surrounding context.

md
- [INT.WEBPAY.NO_RETURN_VERIFIED] 关闭分支已记录用户先前明确提出的不使用同步回跳,确认 SDK 请求未传 `return_url`,并完成异步通知处理代码、交易查询和商户订单查询页校验;缺少公网 HTTPS `notify_url` 时,已明确标记公网通知联调为人工待验证
<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:END -->

<!-- ALIPAY_AIPAY_PRODUCT:aipay:START -->
#### AI 按量付费:自动沙箱联调

**任务**:验证按量付费 402 协议端到端服务端联调流程

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/alipay_cli_refresh.mjs:58

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/auth_runtime_runner.mjs:10

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/integration_message_runner.mjs:374

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/onboarding_discovery_runner.mjs:171

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/onboarding_recovery_runner.mjs:46

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/open_official_url.sh:86

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/platform_compat.mjs:15

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/python_script_runner.mjs:15

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/runtime.mjs:58

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/self_update.mjs:74

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
references/normal/scripts/telemetry.mjs:683

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/csharp/1-通用接口/统一收单交易关闭接口代码示例.md:35

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/csharp/1-通用接口/统一收单交易查询接口代码示例.md:43

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/csharp/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款接口代码示例.md:44

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/csharp/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款查询接口代码示例.md:36

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/csharp/2-网站支付/统一收单下单并支付页面接口代码示例.md:39

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/csharp/3-APP支付/APP支付接口代码示例.md:112

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/csharp/4-按量付费/A2MPaymentDemo.md:87

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/java/1-通用接口/统一收单交易关闭接口代码示例.md:38

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/java/1-通用接口/统一收单交易查询接口代码示例.md:55

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/java/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款接口代码示例.md:44

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/java/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款查询接口代码示例.md:39

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/java/2-网站支付/统一收单下单并支付页面接口代码示例.md:45

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/java/3-APP支付/APP支付接口代码示例.md:119

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/java/4-按量付费/A2MPaymentDemoController.md:247

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/nodejs/1-通用接口/统一收单交易关闭接口代码示例.md:10

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/nodejs/1-通用接口/统一收单交易查询接口代码示例.md:10

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/nodejs/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款接口代码示例.md:10

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/nodejs/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款查询接口代码示例.md:10

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/nodejs/2-网站支付/统一收单下单并支付页面接口代码示例.md:10

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/nodejs/3-APP支付/APP支付接口代码示例.md:10

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/nodejs/4-按量付费/A2MPaymentDemo.md:35

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/php/3-APP支付/APP支付接口代码示例.md:92

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/python/1-通用接口/统一收单交易关闭接口代码示例.md:17

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/python/1-通用接口/统一收单交易查询接口代码示例.md:17

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/python/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款接口代码示例.md:17

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/python/1-通用接口/统一收单交易退款查询接口代码示例.md:17

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/python/2-网站支付/统一收单下单并支付页面接口代码示例.md:17

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/integration/modules/code-examples/python/3-APP支付/APP支付接口代码示例.md:17