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Security audit

Wiki Knowledge Base

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent local wiki skill, but it should be reviewed because it tells the agent to automatically commit the entire Git working tree.

Use this skill only in a dedicated wiki repository or after checking the working tree. Before any Git action, review `git status` and the staged diff, and replace `git add -A` with staging only the intended `wiki/` and `outputs/` files. Keep secrets and unrelated project files out of the repository where this skill runs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:106
Finding

Overbroad Git Staging Can Commit Unrelated Sensitive Files

Content
View full analysis
: " ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs the agent to run `git add -A` after every operation batch. This command stages all modifications, deletions, and untracked files throughout the current Git working tree, including files unrelated to the wiki operation. The intended task only requires changes to designated wiki content and generated reports. Repository-wide staging violates least-scope principles and does not provide an inspection or user-confirmation step before creating a commit. Although this does not directly escalate operating-system privileges, it can cause sensitive or unrelated repository content to be recorded permanently in Git history. Because removing a secret from the working tree does not remove it from existing commits, accidental inclusion may persist and later be disclosed if the repository is shared or pushed. ### Attack Path 1. A sensitive or unrelated file exists in the repository, such as an environment file, credential export, private note, generated token, or another developer's unfinished work. 2. Alternatively, an attacker or untrusted process places a crafted file anywhere inside the Git working tree. 3. The skill performs a legitimate wiki operation. 4. Following `SKILL.md`, the agent executes `git add -A`. 5. Git stages the sensitive or attacker-controlled file together with the intended wiki changes. 6. The chained `git commit` records all staged content without requiring review or explicit user approval. 7. If the repository is later pushed, synchronized, archived, or shared, the unintended content may be exposed. ### Impact Assessment The affected scope is the entire Git working tree rather than only the ...[truncated 703 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
git status --short git diff --cached --stat git diff --cached ``` 4. Require explicit user confirmation after displaying the staged-file list and before running `git commit`. 5. Check for sensitive file types and names, including `.env` files, private keys, credential exports, tokens, archives, and temporary files. 6. Maintain an appropriate `.gitignore`, but do not treat it as a substitute for path-scoped staging and review. 7. Avoid automatic commits when the working tree already contains unrelated changes. Detect this condition before the operation and ask the user how to proceed. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad enough to activate on common research or organization requests, increasing the chance that the skill runs in contexts where the user did not intend wiki creation or file modification. In practice this can lead to unexpected reads/writes, index updates, and downstream git activity in unrelated repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow directs the agent to create and update multiple local files, append logs, modify indexes, and make git commits, but the skill description does not clearly disclose these side effects to the user. Lack of upfront notice undermines informed consent and makes unintended persistent changes more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to run git add -A && git commit, which performs repository-wide state changes beyond the core wiki-editing task. In an agent setting, automatic commits can capture unrelated file changes, create irreversible history noise, and bypass user review before persistence.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The instruction says double-links must "never" use Chinese text, which imposes a language/script restriction as a blanket policy. This is a natural-language locale policy constraint without offering user choice or documenting why the restriction is necessary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.