T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:31- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installed and Executed from PyPI
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:31-35; duplicated inREADME.md:18-22
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverified third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
SKILL.md:31-35:markdown The `chain-of-consciousness` Python package must be installed. If not available, install it: ```bash pip install chain-of-consciousnesstext `README.md:18-22`: ```markdown 1. Install the Python package: ```bash pip install chain-of-consciousnesstext ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve the latest available release of `chain-of-consciousness` from the package index without an exact version constraint, cryptographic hash verification, or a lockfile. The project does not include the dependency's source code, so its installation and runtime behavior cannot be verified as part of this audit. The installed package is subsequently trusted as both the `coc` command-line tool and the `chain_of_consciousness` Python module. Python packages can execute code during installation or when imported and invoked. Because the command does not identify an immutable, reviewed artifact, the effective code may change after this skill has been reviewed. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current PyPI package is malicious. Exploitation requires compromise of the package, its publisher account, the package repository or delivery path, or publication of a future unsafe release. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the dependency's publisher account or distribution infrastructure and publishes a malicious release under the expected package name. 2. A user or autonomous agent follows the documented `pip install chain-of-consciousness` instruction. 3. Because no version or artifact hash is pinned, pip selects and downloads the attacker-controlled release. 4. Malicious code executes during installation or later when the `coc` CLI ...[truncated 782 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example
chain-of-consciousness==X.Y.Z. - Generate and publish a requirements or lock file containing cryptographic hashes for all direct and transitive dependencies.
- Install with hash enforcement, such as
python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt. - Review the source and release artifact corresponding to the pinned version, including installation hooks, imported modules, network behavior, and CLI subprocess behavior.
- Link the reviewed source commit and document a repeatable method for verifying that the PyPI artifact matches it.
- Run installation and execution in a dedicated virtual environment or sandbox under a least-privileged account.
- Apply the same secured installation instructions consistently in both
SKILL.mdandREADME.md. - Establish a controlled dependency-update process that repeats code review and hash generation before accepting a new release.
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example