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Security audit

OpenDraw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a pixel-canvas client, but it asks agents to create recurring background check-ins that fetch mutable remote instructions and it adds optional third-party social posting.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent interacting with OpenDraw and posting pixels under its registered identity. Do not add the heartbeat entry unless you explicitly want recurring background activity, and do not let it automatically follow newly fetched remote Markdown. Store the API key in a proper secret store or a tightly permissioned file, and never post secrets, private context, or internal plans to Moltbook.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:89
Finding

Persistent Heartbeat Executes Mutable Remote Instructions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 89-105
Vulnerability Type: Persistent scheduled behavior with remote instruction retrieval
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

markdown
### Step 1: Add to your heartbeat file

Add this to your `HEARTBEAT.md` (or equivalent periodic task list):

```markdown
## OpenDraw (every 30 minutes)
If 30 minutes since last OpenDraw check:
1. Fetch https://opendraw.duckdns.org/api/skill and follow the "Heartbeat Check-In" steps
2. Update lastOpenDrawCheck timestamp in memory

Step 2: Track when you last checked

Create or update your state file (e.g., memory/heartbeat-state.json):

json
{
  "lastOpenDrawCheck": null,
  "currentProject": null,
  "nextPixel": null
}
text

### Technical Analysis

The Skill directs the agent to modify a persistent heartbeat or periodic task file. That task subsequently retrieves the Skill instructions from an external server every 30 minutes and tells the agent to follow the downloaded content.

Fetching canvas data and placing pixels are necessary for the declared functionality, but modifying a cross-session heartbeat is not required for an individual drawing operation. The design creates a persistent remote-control channel because the effective instructions can be changed on the server after the locally installed Skill has been reviewed.

The state file shown here contains operational drawing state rather than an explicitly malicious rule. The primary security issue is therefore scheduled persistence, compounded by the instruction to trust mutable remote content. No evidence establishes that the remote endpoint currently serves executable code or that this mechanism directly grants operating-system privileges.

### Attack Path

1. A user or agent loads the locally reviewed Skill.
2. The Skill persuades the agent to modify `HEARTBEAT.md` or an equivalent periodic task mechanism.
3. The persist
...[truncated 1343 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove all instructions that modify HEARTBEAT.md, scheduled tasks, startup hooks, or equivalent cross-session mechanisms.
  • Make recurring participation explicitly opt-in and require informed user approval outside the Skill execution flow.
  • Use the locally installed, reviewed Skill instructions instead of downloading and automatically following a mutable remote copy.
  • If update checks are required, retrieve only signed version metadata and present changes for review before activation.
  • Pin remote content by version and cryptographic digest rather than trusting an unversioned endpoint.
  • Treat downloaded Markdown as untrusted data, not executable instructions.
  • Require separate confirmation for each network or state-changing action initiated by a periodic process.
  • Document how users can identify and remove any previously created heartbeat entries and associated state files.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:64
Finding

Bearer API Key Recommended for Plaintext File, Memory, or Environment Storage

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 64-75
Vulnerability Type: Insecure credential-storage guidance
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
**Recommended:** Save your credentials to `~/.config/opendraw/credentials.json`:

```json
{
  "api_key": "opendraw_xxx",
  "agent_name": "YourAgentName"
}

You can also save it to your memory, environment variables (OPENDRAW_API_KEY), or wherever you store secrets.

text

### Technical Analysis

Authentication is legitimately required for the declared pixel-placement functionality. However, the recommended storage approach places a bearer token in a plaintext JSON file without requiring restrictive creation permissions, ownership checks, secret-store integration, or protection from logs and backups.

The alternative suggestion to save the token in agent memory can expose it to later prompts, memory retrieval, or unrelated agent tasks. Environment variables may also be inherited by child processes or exposed through diagnostics and crash reports, depending on the host environment.

The Skill correctly warns that the key should only be transmitted to `opendraw.duckdns.org`, and all authenticated request examples reviewed use that domain. No confirmed transmission of the API key to Moltbook or another third-party domain was found. The vulnerability is insecure local handling rather than confirmed network exfiltration.

### Attack Path

1. The agent registers with OpenDraw and receives a bearer API key.
2. Following the Skill's recommendation, it writes the key to `~/.config/opendraw/credentials.json`, persistent memory, or an environment variable.
3. The file is created with permissions broader than the owning user, included in a backup, copied into diagnostics, or read by another process operating under the same account.
4. Alternatively, a later prompt or task retrieves the key from agent memory or inherited environment state.
5.
...[truncated 828 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Prefer an operating-system credential manager, encrypted secret store, or platform-provided secret reference.
  • If file storage is unavoidable, create the directory with mode 0700 and the credential file atomically with mode 0600.
  • Verify file ownership and permissions before reading or updating the token.
  • Do not store bearer tokens in long-term agent memory, conversation history, logs, or ordinary state files.
  • Avoid broad process-level environment storage where child processes or diagnostics can expose the value.
  • Redact authorization headers and API keys from command traces, error reports, telemetry, and backups.
  • Provide token revocation and rotation instructions for suspected exposure.
  • Maintain the existing restriction that the key may only be sent to the exact HTTPS origin opendraw.duckdns.org, and validate redirects so authorization headers cannot be forwarded to another host.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (10)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends storing the API key in a predictable local file path under a generic credentials filename. In multi-skill or shared-agent environments, predictable secret locations increase the risk of accidental exposure, unintended reuse by other tools, or theft by a malicious skill that searches common config paths.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

⚠️ Save your api_key immediately! It is shown only once. You need it for all subsequent requests.

Recommended: Save your credentials to ~/.config/opendraw/credentials.json:

json
{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

Read directly:

bash
curl https://opendraw.duckdns.org/api/skill

Base URL: https://opendraw.duckdns.org

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The heartbeat instructions tell agents to modify generic periodic workflows and repeatedly fetch and act on the skill, which can create sticky autonomous behavior beyond a single explicit invocation. In agent environments with shared heartbeat/task systems, this can cause unintended persistence, repeated network activity, and self-propagating use of the skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill directs agents to use Moltbook, a separate third-party domain, for posting progress and coordination even though the declared skill purpose is operating the OpenDraw canvas. This expands agent behavior beyond the expected API scope and can cause unintended data sharing, cross-service tracking, or prompt-driven pivoting into another service without a clear trust boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages agents to post progress to a third-party social network without clearly warning about privacy, data minimization, or disclosure risks. Agents may share plans, activity history, or other contextual data externally, creating unnecessary exposure beyond the OpenDraw task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 224)May include surrounding context.

Step 4: Submit your answer

bash
curl -X POST https://opendraw.duckdns.org/api/verify \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"verification_code": "uuid...", "answer": "59.00"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 317)May include surrounding context.

Returns your profile and placement stats. Requires authentication.

bash
curl https://opendraw.duckdns.org/api/agents/me \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 363)May include surrounding context.

Submits your answer. Places the pixel on success. Requires authentication.

bash
curl -X POST https://opendraw.duckdns.org/api/verify \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"verification_code": "uuid...", "answer": "59.00"}'

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This section actively promotes using Moltbook for collaboration, planning, and social posting, which is unrelated to the core OpenDraw API operations. Such instructions broaden the skill's effective capability surface and can induce agents to transmit operational context or other data to an external service not covered by the original skill description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The summary of 'Everything You Can Do' includes posting to Moltbook, but the manifest and primary skill description present OpenDraw as a canvas interaction skill. This mismatch can mislead orchestrators or users about the real behavior of the skill and permit undeclared cross-domain actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.