Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a disclosed WhatsApp Business operations guide that handles lead messaging and local state with clear opt-in, retention, and anti-spam controls.
Install only if you operate the WhatsApp Business number and have consent records for the leads. Use a scoped API token, configure your own timezone and retention values, keep alert destinations limited to approved staff, and avoid using this for legal, medical, or financial leads without privacy review.
The configuration example specifies timezone: Europe/Paris, which imposes a locale-specific operating context. The document does not offer a timezone choice or explain that the skill is only intended for a France/Paris-specific deployment, so this can violate language/locale policy expectations.
This skill explicitly sends lead phone numbers and API credentials to an external BSP over the network, and elsewhere permits forwarding lead identifiers to external alert channels. Although this is central to the skill's purpose, it still creates a real data-exposure boundary: misuse, misconfiguration, overbroad tokens, or insecure downstream systems could leak regulated personal data or allow unauthorized messaging.
After any message a user sends you, you have 24 h to reply in free-form. After 24 h of user silence, only Meta-approved templates, each billed as a new conversation. Free-form to a cold conversation → API rejection or a marketing-conversation bill + a quality hit; exit code 2, always skipped. Check window state before every outbound send:
curl -s "https://app.whatchimp.com/api/v1/whatsapp/get/conversation" \
-d "apiToken=<WA_API_KEY>" -d "phone_number_id=<WA_PHONE_NUMBER_ID>" \
-d "phone_number=<DIGITS>" -d "limit=1"
# Output: {"status":1,"data":[{"sender":"user","created_at":"2026-07-16T09:12:04Z"}]}
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
|---|---|
| Minimize | Store phone + name + case type + status. Never store ID numbers, health details, case documents, or payment data in memory files — keep those in the system of record. |
| Mask | Key the duplicate registers on `sha256(phone)[0:12]`, not the raw number. Lookups work identically; a leaked log exposes nothing. |
| Restrict | `chmod 700 <WORKSPACE_DIR>/memory`. One number = one workspace. Never share `wa-template-log.md` across numbers or brands. |
| Retain | Leads 90 d after last contact, recaps 30 d, template log 30 d — then delete. Prune at the start of the daily run, not "someday": `find "<WORKSPACE_DIR>/memory" -name 'wa-recaps.md' -mtime +30 -delete` (silent — pruned, not archived). |
| Alert payload | Name + case type + phone only. Never paste conversation transcripts into the alert channel — it leaves your machine and is usually a wider audience than the case file. |
| Erase | On an opt-out or deletion request: purge every register, add the hash to `wa-blacklist.md`, confirm to the lead. Blacklist stores hashes only. |
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
|---|---|
| Minimize | Store phone + name + case type + status. Never store ID numbers, health details, case documents, or payment data in memory files — keep those in the system of record. |
| Mask | Key the duplicate registers on `sha256(phone)[0:12]`, not the raw number. Lookups work identically; a leaked log exposes nothing. |
| Restrict | `chmod 700 <WORKSPACE_DIR>/memory`. One number = one workspace. Never share `wa-template-log.md` across numbers or brands. |
| Retain | Leads 90 d after last contact, recaps 30 d, template log 30 d — then delete. Prune at the start of the daily run, not "someday": `find "<WORKSPACE_DIR>/memory" -name 'wa-recaps.md' -mtime +30 -delete` (silent — pruned, not archived). |
| Alert payload | Name + case type + phone only. Never paste conversation transcripts into the alert channel — it leaves your machine and is usually a wider audience than the case file. |
| Erase | On an opt-out or deletion request: purge every register, add the hash to `wa-blacklist.md`, confirm to the lead. Blacklist stores hashes only. |
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
memory/: wa-state.md (phase/tier/quality) · wa-alerts-sent.md · wa-template-log.md · wa-crm-state.md · wa-blacklist.md (hashes) · wa-clients-known.md · wa-recaps.md · wa-learnings.md · wa-incidents.md. Shared: ../shared/leads-whatsapp.json (written by upstream social agents, read by wa-outbound).
mkdir -p "<WORKSPACE_DIR>/memory" && chmod 700 "$_" && cd "$_" && for f in wa-recaps wa-state \
wa-alerts-sent wa-template-log wa-crm-state wa-blacklist wa-clients-known wa-learnings \
wa-incidents; do [ -f "$f.md" ] || : > "$f.md"; done
mkdir -p "<WORKSPACE_DIR>/../shared" && Q="<WORKSPACE_DIR>/../shared/leads-whatsapp.json"
No suspicious patterns detected.