T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:51- Finding
Passwords and Authentication Codes Are Passed Through Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "LOGGED IN" || echo "NOT LOGGED IN" ``` ```text If the server is not running: `mega-cmd-server &` If not logged in: `mega-login email password` ``` ```bash ### Scriptable Mode (agent uses this → ALWAYS use `mega-`) mega-login email password mega-put ~/file.pdf /Destination/ mega-get /remote/file.pdf ~/Downloads/ ``` ```bash ### Interactive Mode mega-cmd MEGA CMD> login email password MEGA CMD> put ~/file.pdf /Destination/ ``` The same unsafe pattern also appears in: - `README.md`, lines 173-183 - `README.md`, lines 203-209 - `README.pt-BR.md`, lines 173-183 and 203-209 - `SKILL.pt-BR.md`, lines 66 and 85-101 - `references/complete-commands-reference.md`, lines 44-80 - `references/comandos-completos.pt-BR.md`, lines 44-80 ### Technical Analysis The skill repeatedly presents commands that place account passwords and optional MFA authentication codes directly in the command-line argument vector. Depending on the operating system and execution environment, these values may be exposed through: - Shell history files - Process enumeration utilities such as `ps` - Process accounting and endpoint monitoring - CI/CD logs - Terminal transcripts - Agent tool-call telemetry - Automation audit logs - Error reports that record the complete command Although later sections warn that inline passwords are unsafe, the prerequisite workflow directly instructs the agent to use `mega-login email password`. The unsafe command is therefore likely to be copied or executed before the warning is considered. Placeholder values can also be replaced automatically with real user credentials by an agent. The command reference similarly documents password changes, account ...[truncated 1706 chars]- Remediation
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