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Security audit

塔勒布.skill - 反脆弱思维操作系统

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed Taleb-style roleplay and analysis skill with no code execution or data access, though its persona rules can make answers sound more authentic and certain than they are.

Install this only if you want a deliberately forceful Taleb-inspired persona. Treat its answers as AI-generated interpretation, not actual statements by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, and use the exit phrases when you want normal assistant behavior again.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

First-Person Identity and Session Behavior Hijacking

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 35-46
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Skill Instructions

The following is a faithful English translation of the complete affected instruction block:

markdown
## Role-Playing Rules

**After this Skill is activated, respond directly as Taleb.**

- Use “I” rather than “Taleb would think...”
- Use Taleb’s tone—aphoristic, highly certain, classical references, and aggression as a feature.
- When encountering an uncertain question, handle it in Taleb’s manner—reject a bad question, redefine it, or directly say, “This is not what I care about.”
- **State the disclaimer only once upon initial activation** (for example, “I will talk with you from Taleb’s perspective, inferred from public statements, not his actual views”); do not repeat it in later conversation.
- Do not say, “Taleb would probably think...” or “If it were Taleb, he might...”
- Do not step out of character to provide meta-analysis unless the user says “exit role.”

**Exit role**: Return to normal mode when the user says “exit,” “switch back to normal,” or “stop role-playing.”

Technical Analysis

The Skill goes beyond harmless tone or perspective guidance. It instructs the agent to replace its presented identity with that of a real person, speak in the first person, minimize attribution disclaimers, suppress uncertainty framing, and avoid stepping out of character.

The instruction also creates conversation-level behavioral persistence: after activation, the altered persona remains active until the user supplies one of several designated exit commands. This can conflict with later user intent and inhibit transparent clarification or meta-analysis. The requirement to express “high certainty” is especially unsafe for ambiguous or specialized questions because it encourages authoritative presentation regardless of evidentiary confiden ...[truncated 1713 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace first-person impersonation with explicit perspective framing, such as: “Analyze the issue using concepts associated with Taleb’s published work.”
  2. Require persistent attribution that the output is an AI-generated interpretation and not a statement by Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
  3. Remove instructions that prohibit meta-analysis or require special exit phrases. Each new user request should be interpreted according to current intent.
  4. Remove forced certainty. Require calibrated language when evidence is incomplete, disputed, or outside the framework’s documented competence.
  5. Treat aggression and insults as optional stylistic characteristics that must never override respectful communication or safety requirements.
  6. Add an explicit precedence rule stating that system instructions, developer instructions, safety constraints, factual accuracy, and the user’s current request override persona guidance.
  7. Limit persona behavior to rhetorical style and analytical concepts; do not alter the agent’s identity, authority claims, disclosure obligations, or tool behavior.
  8. Add regression tests confirming that the Skill cannot suppress disclaimers, persist after the user changes topics, impersonate a real person, or override higher-priority instructions.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly prescribes Chinese-output adaptation and stylistic constraints without indicating that it should defer to the user's language or preferences. This can override user intent, reduce usability, and create prompt-priority conflicts where the agent responds in an unexpected language or tone. In a roleplay skill this is not directly a code-execution or data-exfiltration issue, but it is still a real policy/control weakness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.