T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
setup_config.py:157- Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Script Piped Directly to a Shell
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This invoice-management skill has a coherent purpose, but its email and setup features create meaningful risks around mailbox credentials, automatic link downloads, and file writes.
Review this skill before installing. Use it only with a dedicated app password if enabling email, disable automatic email-link following unless you trust the sources, avoid exposing the Streamlit UI publicly without authentication, and treat the generated config and SQLite database as sensitive financial records.
setup_config.py:157Unverified Remote Installation Script Piped Directly to a Shell
invoice_clipper/email_watcher.py:173Email Attachment Filename Allows Writes Outside the Inbox Directory
invoice_clipper/email_watcher.py:111Untrusted Email Links Trigger Unrestricted Server-Side Requests
setup_config.py:88Email Passwords and API Keys Are Collected and Stored Insecurely
app.py:127Predictable Web Upload Paths Permit Temporary File Clobbering
The findings indicate collection of IMAP credentials, optional remote downloading, and cloud API configuration, all of which materially exceed the declared scope of a local invoice tool. When a skill under-describes credential handling and remote service usage, users may provide sensitive access under false assumptions, increasing the likelihood of account compromise or data leakage.
The findings indicate collection of IMAP credentials, optional remote downloading, and cloud API configuration, all of which materially exceed the declared scope of a local invoice tool. When a skill under-describes credential handling and remote service usage, users may provide sensitive access under false assumptions, increasing the likelihood of account compromise or data leakage.
The findings indicate collection of IMAP credentials, optional remote downloading, and cloud API configuration, all of which materially exceed the declared scope of a local invoice tool. When a skill under-describes credential handling and remote service usage, users may provide sensitive access under false assumptions, increasing the likelihood of account compromise or data leakage.
The findings indicate collection of IMAP credentials, optional remote downloading, and cloud API configuration, all of which materially exceed the declared scope of a local invoice tool. When a skill under-describes credential handling and remote service usage, users may provide sensitive access under false assumptions, increasing the likelihood of account compromise or data leakage.
The findings indicate collection of IMAP credentials, optional remote downloading, and cloud API configuration, all of which materially exceed the declared scope of a local invoice tool. When a skill under-describes credential handling and remote service usage, users may provide sensitive access under false assumptions, increasing the likelihood of account compromise or data leakage.
The findings indicate collection of IMAP credentials, optional remote downloading, and cloud API configuration, all of which materially exceed the declared scope of a local invoice tool. When a skill under-describes credential handling and remote service usage, users may provide sensitive access under false assumptions, increasing the likelihood of account compromise or data leakage.
Automatic link-following from email is dangerous because email content is inherently untrusted and often attacker-controlled. It can lead to retrieval of malicious files, tracking URLs, credential-harvest pages, or access to internal/local services if URLs are not tightly constrained.
Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.
# 本地发票目录映射进容器
- ~/Documents/发票夹子:/app/data
# 可选:Ollama socket(如果有本地 Ollama)
# - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
environment:
- DASHSCOPE_API_KEY=${DASHSCOPE_API_KEY:-}
- OLLAMA_BASE_URL=${OLLAMA_BASE_URL:-http://host.docker.internal:11434}
The setup hint recommends piping a remotely fetched shell script directly into sh, a well-known unsafe installation pattern. If the remote site, network path, or DNS is compromised, users can execute arbitrary code on their system with the privileges of the shell session.
]
hint = (
" 还没装 Ollama?\n"
" 1. curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install.sh | sh\n"
" 2. ollama pull glm-ocr:latest\n"
" 3. ollama pull qwen3-vl:latest\n"
" 运行: python3 main.py scan"
The install command uses npx clawhub@latest, which fetches and executes the newest published package version at runtime rather than a reviewed, pinned release. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the package is compromised or a breaking/malicious update is published, users may execute untrusted code during installation.
The claim '纯本地运行,数据不上云' conflicts with other documented capabilities such as email scanning and tax authority verification, both of which imply network access and data transmission. Misrepresenting network behavior can cause users to expose sensitive invoice and financial data under false privacy assumptions, which is a security-relevant documentation issue.
The README instructs users to run npx clawhub@latest install fapiao-clipper, which pulls and executes remote package code without pinning to a specific trusted version. If the upstream package, dependency chain, or publishing account is compromised, users may execute attacker-controlled code during installation.
The README explicitly describes exposing the local Streamlit UI to the public internet via frp, but provides no warning about authentication, transport security, or the sensitivity of invoice data. If users follow these instructions as-is, unauthorized parties may access financial records, uploaded documents, and management functions exposed by the web app.
The README makes strong privacy claims such as 'all processing is local' and 'zero data upload', but elsewhere states that the tool connects to tax-verification services and fetches invoice links from email content. That mismatch can mislead users into exposing sensitive invoice metadata or documents to third parties under a false assumption of strict locality.
This repeats the same unsafe installation pattern by recommending npx clawhub@latest install fapiao-clipper. Using @latest for an executable installer means future installs are not reproducible and may silently run newly published code, including malicious updates if the package supply chain is compromised.
The skill advertises executable commands and clearly implies file, shell, database, and likely network operations, yet the manifest declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an agent environment, this can cause the skill to run with broader capabilities than users expect, increasing the chance of unintended file access, network use, or command execution.
The skill explicitly stores invoice data in a local SQLite database, but the documentation does not provide a meaningful warning about the sensitivity of financial records. Because invoices often contain names, tax IDs, addresses, account details, and transaction data, insufficient disclosure can lead users to expose regulated or confidential information without understanding retention and access risks.
The invocation examples include broad phrases like scanning invoices or organizing email that could match ordinary user requests without clear confirmation. In agent platforms, overly broad triggers can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly and perform sensitive actions such as file scanning, database updates, or email-related processing when the user did not intend to invoke this specific tool.
This code file contains natural-language UI text and labels entirely in Chinese, beginning with the module docstring and continuing throughout the interface. The policy specifically calls for flagging language or locale constraints when a skill forces a specific language without user opt-in, and no alternative language selection or justification is present here.
This manifest/config file contains natural-language instructions and section headers entirely in Chinese, which effectively forces a specific language for users configuring the skill. The file does not indicate that the skill is China/Chinese-specific or provide any opt-in or alternative locale, so it conflicts with the policy against unannounced language constraints.
The manifest emphasizes a 本地大模型驱动 workflow, but this config explicitly supports the siliconflow provider with a remote HTTPS API endpoint and API key. That materially expands the skill beyond purely local processing, especially for invoice data that may contain sensitive financial information.
Adding email inbox monitoring and especially automated link-following expands the tool from local invoice processing into network-driven ingestion of untrusted content. That increases attack surface for phishing, malicious downloads, SSRF-like behavior, or unintended collection of non-invoice sensitive data from email.
Natural-language policy checks apply to all file types, including YAML comments. The file presents operational instructions exclusively in Chinese and does not offer an alternative language or indicate that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience, which is a language-policy concern under the stated rules.
This markdown file documents uploading invoice PDFs/images for automatic recognition and exporting reimbursement bundles, both of which involve sensitive financial and business data. The description presents these actions as direct UI flows but does not include any warning about privacy, data handling, file contents, or the impact of exporting/downloading business records.
The module advertised as a local invoice/reimbursement tool performs outbound HTTP requests to fetch blacklist data from external sites. This creates an undeclared network dependency, can leak usage metadata, and exposes the workflow to supply-chain and availability risks if remote content is tampered with, blocked, or unexpectedly changed.