Tdnet Disclosure Mcp

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 7:18 PM UTC
• Version: 0.1.2

Overview

This skill coherently installs and documents a TDNET disclosure lookup tool, with a supply-chain caution because the external Python package is not pinned to a reviewed version.

Install only if you are comfortable trusting the external Python package publisher. Prefer a reviewed pinned version or hash-locked install in a sandboxed environment, and verify important financial disclosures against official TDNET or exchange sources before relying on them.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:4

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation Creates Supply-Chain Risk

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:4 and SKILL.md:85-88
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

yaml

metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"📋","requires":{"bins":["tdnet-disclosure-mcp"]},"install":[{"id":"uv","kind":"uv","package":"tdnet-disclosure-mcp","bins":["tdnet-disclosure-mcp"],"label":"Install tdnet-disclosure-mcp (uv)"}],"tags":["japan","finance","tdnet","disclosure","earnings","stock","jpx","tse","mcp"]}}

markdown

## Setup

- No API key required
- Python package: `pip install tdnet-disclosure-mcp` or `uv tool install tdnet-disclosure-mcp`
- Data source: Yanoshin Web API (mirrors TDNET data)

Technical Analysis

The Skill directs the environment to install and execute the external tdnet-disclosure-mcp Python package without specifying an exact version, integrity hash, lockfile, trusted repository URL, or verified publisher identity. Consequently, pip or uv resolves whichever release is current at installation time.

The project contains only SKILL.md; it does not include the package implementation or other executable source that would allow its runtime behavior to be audited. The reviewed content does not establish that the current package is malicious. However, the installation mechanism leaves the effective executable dependency mutable after review and exposes users to compromised publisher accounts, malicious future releases, package-index compromise, or dependency-resolution attacks.

Python packages may execute code during installation depending on their build configuration and will execute package-controlled code when the installed command is invoked.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, distribution channel, or a dependency used by tdnet-disclosure-mcp, or publishes a malicious future release.
2. The attacker distributes a modified package v ...[truncated 1058 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin the package to an exact, reviewed version in both Skill metadata and setup commands, such as tdnet-disclosure-mcp==X.Y.Z.
2. Require cryptographic artifact hashes through a hash-locked requirements file or equivalent package-manager lockfile.
3. Document the canonical source repository, expected package-index namespace, and verified publisher identity.
4. Review the pinned package source and its complete transitive dependency tree before publication.
5. Use a private or controlled package mirror where feasible and permit only approved artifacts.
6. Perform installation and execution in a sandbox with minimal filesystem, credential, and network access.
7. Add automated dependency monitoring and require a new security review before updating the pinned version.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Rp1

Low

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs users to install the MCP server package without pinning to a specific version, which creates a supply-chain risk: future package updates could introduce malicious code or breaking changes and would be implicitly trusted at install time. In this context the risk is somewhat limited because the file is documentation-only and does not auto-execute installation, but users following the command may still retrieve an unexpected package version.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.