T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:4
- Finding
- Unpinned and Unverifiable Third-Party Executable Dependency## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 4 and 73 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party package installation and execution **Risk Level**: Medium **Complete Code Snippet**: ```yaml metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"📰","requires":{"bins":["japan-news-mcp"]},"install":[{"id":"uv","kind":"uv","package":"japan-news-mcp","bins":["japan-news-mcp"],"label":"Install japan-news-mcp (uv)"}],"tags":["japan","news","finance","rss","mcp","business","economy","japanese"]}} ``` ```text - Python package: `pip install japan-news-mcp` or `uv tool install japan-news-mcp` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill installs and executes the `japan-news-mcp` package by its registry name without specifying an exact version, integrity hash, lockfile, or verified source repository. Both documented installation methods resolve a package version from an external package registry at installation time. Because the effective executable is not included in the audited project, its implementation cannot be verified from the available artifact. The package selected during a future installation may also differ from the version that existed when the skill was reviewed. This creates a supply-chain exposure if the package publisher, registry account, package namespace, build pipeline, or transitive dependencies are compromised. This finding does not establish that the current package is malicious. It identifies the unsafe trust and installation model through which a malicious or compromised future release could be introduced. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, package build pipeline, or a relevant dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected `japan-news-mcp` package name. 3. A user or agent follows the skill metadata or documentation and runs `uv tool install japan-news-mcp` or `pip install japan-news-mcp`. 4. The package manager resolves the attacker-controlled ...[truncated 1181 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `japan-news-mcp` to a specific, reviewed version in both the installation metadata and documentation. 2. Use a lockfile or package-manager mechanism that verifies cryptographic hashes for the package and all transitive dependencies. 3. Document the canonical source repository, publisher identity, and package registry URL so users can verify package provenance. 4. Prefer reproducible builds and signed release artifacts, and verify signatures before installation. 5. Include the executable source code in the audited artifact or reference an immutable source commit for independent review. 6. Review package installation hooks and disable unnecessary build or installation-time script execution where supported. 7. Run the tool with least privilege in an isolated environment that exposes only the files and network access required to retrieve the documented RSS feeds. 8. Establish an update-review process so version changes are explicitly audited rather than automatically resolving the newest registry release.
