T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:29- Finding
Unverified Public Registry Installation Instructions Create a Dependency-Confusion Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:29-31andREADME.md:40-42
Vulnerability Type: Unverified package source and dependency confusion
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash # Method 2: pip installation (coming soon) pip install skill-trackerbash # Method 2: npm installation (coming soon) npm install skill-trackerTechnical Analysis
The documentation instructs users to install
skill-trackerfrom the public Python and npm registries while simultaneously stating that these distribution methods are “coming soon.” The instructions do not identify a verified registry publisher, pin an exact version, provide a package hash, or otherwise establish that the downloaded registry artifacts correspond to the audited source code.If either package name is unregistered, abandoned, or controlled by an unrelated party, an attacker could publish malicious content under that name. Package installation can execute package-controlled code, including npm lifecycle scripts and Python build-system logic. Consequently, following these commands may execute code that was not included in this audit.
Attack Path
- An attacker registers or gains control of the
skill-trackername on PyPI or npm. - The attacker publishes a package containing malicious installation or runtime code.
- A user follows the installation command in
README.md. - The package manager retrieves the attacker-controlled artifact from the public registry.
- Malicious build, installation, lifecycle, import, or runtime code executes with the privileges of the user running the package manager.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. The resulting access could include reading or modifying files available to that user, accessing environment variables and developer credentials, altering the project, or installing additional mal ...[truncated 123 chars]
- An attacker registers or gains control of the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the public registry installation commands until official packages have been published and registry ownership has been verified.
- In the interim, direct users to install the audited local source, such as
pip install ., or use an authenticated and pinned repository reference. - Once published, document the verified publisher identity and official registry URLs.
- Pin exact release versions rather than using an unconstrained package name.
- For Python deployments, publish hashes and recommend hash-verified installation with a locked requirements file.
- For Node.js deployments, commit and verify a lockfile and use
npm ciin automated environments. - Ensure that published registry artifacts are reproducibly generated from tagged, reviewed source releases.
- Protect publisher accounts with multi-factor authentication and trusted publishing.
