QA测试主管 测试策略治理

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 8:09 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a QA test-strategy planning skill with no executable code, network behavior, persistence, or hidden high-impact actions.

Installers should expect this skill to influence QA planning and to consult local project guidance such as AI-ENTRY.md, CLAUDE.md, and related repo documentation if those files exist. Review the broad activation keywords if you want tighter invocation boundaries.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (5)

Tp2

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 85% confidence

Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The invocation guidance says to use the skill for keywords such as "test plan," "coverage," and "quality risk," which are generic phrases that can appear in many ordinary engineering conversations. The file does not provide exclusion conditions or negative examples to clarify when the skill should not activate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium

• Category: Agent Snooping
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md

- `AI-ENTRY.md`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/testing/SKILL.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/planning/SKILL.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/documentation-standards/SKILL.md`

Skill Enumeration

Medium

• Category: Agent Snooping
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md

- `AI-ENTRY.md`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/testing/SKILL.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/planning/SKILL.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/documentation-standards/SKILL.md`

# Responsibilities

Skill Enumeration

Medium

• Category: Agent Snooping
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md

- `CLAUDE.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/testing/SKILL.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/planning/SKILL.md`
- `dev/ai/skills/documentation-standards/SKILL.md`

# Responsibilities

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.