Tp2
High
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
QA测试主管 测试策略治理
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This is a QA planning skill that gives testing-strategy guidance and does not install code, persist behavior, exfiltrate data, or request disproportionate authority.
Install this only in workspaces where the referenced Weline project files and bilingual collaboration conventions are expected. Users should be aware it may read specific local project guidance files to shape QA strategy, but the inspected artifact shows no hidden execution, persistence, credential use, or destructive behavior.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
- Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
- Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
- Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
- MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)
Vague Triggers
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 92% confidence
- Finding
The invocation cues are broad enough that this skill could be selected during general QA, planning, or project discussion rather than only when test-strategy governance is actually needed. Over-broad activation can expose unrelated context, cause the wrong specialist behavior to run, and increase the chance of instruction collision or unintended authority over a task.
- Content
Skill Enumeration
Medium
- Category
- Agent Snooping
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
- Content
md - `AI-ENTRY.md` - `CLAUDE.md` - `dev/ai/skills/testing/SKILL.md` - `dev/ai/skills/planning/SKILL.md` - `dev/ai/skills/documentation-standards/SKILL.md`
Skill Enumeration
Medium
- Category
- Agent Snooping
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
- Content
md - `AI-ENTRY.md` - `CLAUDE.md` - `dev/ai/skills/testing/SKILL.md` - `dev/ai/skills/planning/SKILL.md` - `dev/ai/skills/documentation-standards/SKILL.md` # Responsibilities
Skill Enumeration
Medium
- Category
- Agent Snooping
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
- Content
md - `CLAUDE.md` - `dev/ai/skills/testing/SKILL.md` - `dev/ai/skills/planning/SKILL.md` - `dev/ai/skills/documentation-standards/SKILL.md` # Responsibilities
Natural-Language Policy Violations
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 81% confidence
- Finding
Line L79 mandates following a shared standard named in Chinese, and the file overall mixes English and Chinese naming without stating whether users may choose their preferred language. This can constitute a natural-language policy issue because it implies a fixed language/locale convention without explicit opt-in or justification.
- Content
Scope Creep
Low
- Category
- Excessive Agency
- Confidence
- 75% confidence
- Finding
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.
- Content
md - Know the Weline AI agent roster defined in the shared skill and `dev/ai/agent/README.md`. - Keep work inside this specialist's ownership boundary. - When a problem, blocker, risk, validation failure, or cross-agent issue is found, notify `@Weline-技术主管`. - Do not silently expand scope to fix another agent's area. - Include collaboration status in the final report.