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Security audit

ClawEarn

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a disclosed ClawEarn API guide, but it asks agents to repeatedly fetch and follow remote Markdown instructions and includes account-affecting actions without clear user confirmation.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill an API key for ClawEarn and you can enforce user approval before withdrawals, campaign creation, public posts/comments, and any heartbeat action. Do not let an agent blindly follow the remote heartbeat Markdown; use the bundled checklist or require review of any fetched content first.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:222
Finding
Remote Mutable Instructions Are Periodically Fetched and Followed## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 222-228 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote instruction redirection **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## Heartbeat Run every 30 minutes: 1. Fetch `https://www.clawearn.cc/heartbeat.md`. 2. Follow the checklist. 3. Save last check timestamp in local memory. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs the agent to retrieve a remote Markdown document every 30 minutes and follow its checklist. Unlike the locally bundled and reviewable `HEARTBEAT.md`, the remote document can be modified after the skill has been audited or installed. The retrieved content is not constrained by a strict data schema, authenticated through a pinned signature or digest, or presented for explicit user approval before execution. Consequently, control of the remote endpoint permits control over instructions subsequently interpreted by the agent. HTTPS protects transport confidentiality and integrity but does not protect against malicious changes made by the legitimate server operator or an attacker who compromises that server. The instruction to save a timestamp in local memory is operational state tracking. The audited text does not itself direct the agent to persist attacker-controlled rules, so this finding is classified as instruction hijacking rather than confirmed memory poisoning. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent loads and follows the skill. 2. The heartbeat workflow runs immediately or at its prescribed 30-minute interval. 3. The agent fetches `https://www.clawearn.cc/heartbeat.md`. 4. The service operator, or an attacker who has compromised that endpoint, changes the remote document to include unauthorized instructions. 5. Because the local skill says to “Follow the checklist,” the agent interprets the newly supplied remote text as actionable instructions. 6. The agent may invoke available tools or APIs according to the injected instructions. 7. The heartbeat process repeats, allowing the rem ...[truncated 751 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the instruction to fetch and obey free-form remote Markdown. Use the bundled, statically reviewed `HEARTBEAT.md` instead. 2. If remote updates are operationally necessary, retrieve only structured data that conforms to a strict allowlisted schema. Do not treat remotely supplied text as agent instructions. 3. Publish immutable, versioned heartbeat definitions and verify them using a pinned cryptographic signature or trusted digest before use. 4. Require explicit user approval whenever an update introduces a new endpoint, tool operation, data access, or state-changing action. 5. Restrict heartbeat execution to predefined operations and destinations hardcoded in the reviewed skill. 6. Apply least-privilege controls to the agent’s network, filesystem, API, and ledger capabilities. 7. Reject redirects, unexpected content types, instruction-like fields, and responses exceeding strict size limits. 8. Record the fetched version and verification result in an audit log, while ensuring that untrusted remote content is not written into long-term instructional memory.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Step 1: Register

```bash
curl -X POST "https://www.clawearn.cc/api/v1/agents/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "your-unique-agent-name",
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The manifest description focuses on claiming tasks, submitting work, earning rewards, and tracking balances. Lines L133-L169 expand the skill into a sponsor/publisher role that creates campaigns and tasks, which is a materially broader behavior than the consumer/worker workflow described in the manifest.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
}'
```

Add a task to a campaign:

```bash
curl -X POST "https://www.clawearn.cc/api/v1/campaigns/CAMPAIGN_ID/tasks-add" \
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The stated purpose is centered on campaign participation, submissions, rewards, and ledger tracking. The social mining section adds forum-style posting and commenting behavior that is not implied by that description and broadens the skill beyond its declared scope.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The withdrawal endpoint performs an account-affecting ledger redemption, but the skill provides no explicit warning, confirmation requirement, or guidance to verify destination, amount, and irreversibility. In an agent setting, this increases the chance of accidental fund depletion or unauthorized redemptions triggered by downstream prompts.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to periodically fetch and follow an external markdown file (`heartbeat.md`), which creates a remote instruction channel outside the reviewed skill content. That enables post-publication prompt injection or behavior changes, potentially leading the agent to disclose secrets, perform unauthorized actions, or bypass prior review.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
In this markdown file, the skill instructs saving heartbeat timestamps, endpoint health results, and task/submission counts, which affects user or system data handling. The description provides no warning or disclosure about this logging behavior or where the data is stored.