AIML Embeddings Generator

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 12:47 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a straightforward AIMLAPI embeddings helper that sends user-provided text to a documented external API and saves the response locally.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the text you embed, plus your AIMLAPI API key as an Authorization header, to AIMLAPI. Avoid embedding secrets, regulated data, or proprietary text unless your AIMLAPI account and data-handling terms are acceptable for that content.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Taint Tracking: Direct Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (5)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.getenv (line 41, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical

• Category: Data Flow
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/gen_embeddings.py (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

python

while True:
        try:
            if verbose: print(f"[debug] POST {url} attempt {attempt + 1}")
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as response:
                return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
        except (urllib.error.HTTPError, urllib.error.URLError) as exc:
            if attempt < retry_max:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The skill declares access to an API key and describes script usage that performs network calls and writes output files, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization gap where the runtime capabilities exceed what is transparently advertised, increasing the chance of unintended secret exposure, file modification, or external data transmission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/endpoints.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md

import urllib.request
from typing import Any

DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1"
DEFAULT_USER_AGENT = "openclaw-aimlapi-embeddings/1.0"

def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/gen_embeddings.py (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

python

import urllib.request
from typing import Any

DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1"
DEFAULT_USER_AGENT = "openclaw-aimlapi-embeddings/1.0"

def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

The script sends arbitrary user-provided text and the API credential to an external third-party embeddings service without any explicit warning, consent prompt, or safeguards around sensitive content. In a skill context, users may pass proprietary or regulated text assuming local processing, creating a real confidentiality and compliance risk even though the transmission is intentional.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.