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Security audit

AIML Embeddings Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward AIMLAPI embeddings helper that sends user-provided text to a documented external API and saves the response locally.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the text you embed, plus your AIMLAPI API key as an Authorization header, to AIMLAPI. Avoid embedding secrets, regulated data, or proprietary text unless your AIMLAPI account and data-handling terms are acceptable for that content.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.getenv (line 41, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
while True:
        try:
            if verbose: print(f"[debug] POST {url} attempt {attempt + 1}")
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as response:
                return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
        except (urllib.error.HTTPError, urllib.error.URLError) as exc:
            if attempt < retry_max:
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The skill declares access to an API key and describes script usage that performs network calls and writes output files, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization gap where the runtime capabilities exceed what is transparently advertised, increasing the chance of unintended secret exposure, file modification, or external data transmission.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
import urllib.request
from typing import Any

DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1"
DEFAULT_USER_AGENT = "openclaw-aimlapi-embeddings/1.0"

def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
import urllib.request
from typing import Any

DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1"
DEFAULT_USER_AGENT = "openclaw-aimlapi-embeddings/1.0"

def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The script sends arbitrary user-provided text and the API credential to an external third-party embeddings service without any explicit warning, consent prompt, or safeguards around sensitive content. In a skill context, users may pass proprietary or regulated text assuming local processing, creating a real confidentiality and compliance risk even though the transmission is intentional.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.