T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Creates Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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=2.28.0 ``` `README.md:33` and `README_ENG.md:27`: ```bash pip install requests ``` ### Technical Analysis The project permits installation of any `requests` release at or above version 2.28.0 and separately instructs users to install the latest version available from the configured package index. It does not provide an exact version pin, lock file, package hash, or index restriction. Consequently, the installed dependency may differ between environments and over time. If the package distribution channel or maintainer account were compromised, or an unreviewed future release introduced malicious or vulnerable behavior, installation could retrieve that release without an integrity check. Source distributions and package build backends can execute code during package build or installation. This is a supply-chain hardening weakness rather than evidence that the current `requests` package or project code is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the dependency publisher, package-index distribution path, or another trusted package-release mechanism. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release satisfying `requests>=2.28.0`. 3. A user follows the documented installation command or installs `requirements.txt`. 4. The package resolver selects the malicious compatible release. 5. Malicious build or package code executes during installation or when TrainClaw imports and uses the dependency. This path requires compromise of a trusted upstream distribution mechanism; no dependency-confusion package name or currently malicious dependency was identified. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute code with the privileges of the account performing the installation or running ...[truncated 485 chars]- Remediation
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