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Security audit

SocialKit X Post

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s X posting workflow includes approval checks, and its additional social-platform sign-in options require explicit selection.

Review the separate socialkit-social-core dependency before use. Connect only the intended account, protect the locally stored tokens, and approve the exact post, media and estimated charge before publishing.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (9)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Sign in once (browser, local redirect): `node scripts/auth.mjs --platform x`

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
3. Write `post.json` (text, media with alt text, options). See `node scripts/publish.mjs --help`.

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
4. Validate: `node scripts/publish.mjs --check --dir x-<slug>`

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md
6. Publish: `node scripts/publish.mjs --publish --dir x-<slug>` and report the result.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, network.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/auth.mjs (reported line 621)May include surrounding context.

js
return v;
}
function apiBase(env) {
  return env[PIN_ENV.sandbox] === "1" ? "https://api-sandbox.pinterest.com/v5" : "https://api.pinterest.com/v5";
}
function basic(env) {
  return {

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/auth.mjs (reported line 649)May include surrounding context.

js
async function finishPinterestLogin(pastedUrl, env = process.env, fetchImpl) {
  const { code, redirectUri } = finishPasteback("pinterest", pastedUrl, env);
  const res = await postForm(
    "https://api.pinterest.com/v5/oauth/token",
    { grant_type: "authorization_code", code, redirect_uri: redirectUri, continuous_refresh: "true" },
    basic(env),
    fetchImpl

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/auth.mjs (reported line 666)May include surrounding context.

js
"pinterest",
      async (t) => toToken(
        await postForm(
          "https://api.pinterest.com/v5/oauth/token",
          { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: t.refreshToken },
          basic(env)
        ),

The X-posting skill exposes authentication and account queries for unrelated social platforms.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The executable CLI supports TikTok, LinkedIn, and Pinterest authentication at L1316–L1337, in addition to Pinterest board listing and TikTok creator-information queries at L1309–L1310. These reachable operations obtain and persist unrelated platform credentials or access account data, neither of which is needed for the manifest's X-only posting purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.