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Security audit

SocialKit Social Inbox

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

Review is needed because approval does not lock all reply destinations and account details, and the script supports additional platforms beyond those advertised.

Ask the publisher to make approval cover reply text, platform, destination and sending account, and to require explicit opt-in for additional platforms before enabling sends. Use a dedicated posts folder and keep the inbox private, then delete it when finished. Manual inspection addressed material gaps in the partial scanner report, but separate core and authentication skills were unavailable for review. The evidence supports an approval and scope concern, not intentional theft or malicious behavior.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (12)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Fetch: `node scripts/inbox.mjs --fetch --root <posts folder> --inbox <inbox folder>`

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
terminal: `node scripts/inbox.mjs --approve --inbox <inbox folder>`

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
5. Send: `node scripts/inbox.mjs --send --inbox <inbox folder>`. Already-sent replies are

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/inbox.mjs (reported line 580)May include surrounding context.

js
function defaultHint(error) {
  switch (error.code) {
    case 190:
      return "The access token is expired or invalid. Re-run the auth script for this platform.";
    case 4:
    case 17:
    case 32:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/inbox.mjs (reported line 2499)May include surrounding context.

js
onError: (status, body) => new PlatformError(
      `MASTODON_${status}`,
      String(body.error ?? `Mastodon API error ${status}`),
      status === 401 || status === 403 ? "The access token is invalid or lacks write:statuses / write:media." : void 0
    )
  });
}

Approval binds reply text but not its destination, allowing approved replies to be redirected.

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Approval hashes only replies.json, while sending resolves the platform, destination, and author from the unhashed comments.json. An attacker or agent able to modify that file after approval can preserve an approved commentId while changing its destination or platform, causing an authenticated reply somewhere the user did not approve.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
## Rules

- Never reply on the user's behalf without approval, and never send replies that make
  promises, give refunds, or share personal details unless the user wrote that wording.
- Replying on YouTube is not supported (it needs an extra Google permission); list those
  comments for the user to answer in YouTube Studio.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/inbox.mjs (reported line 1661)May include surrounding context.

js
return v;
}
function apiBase(env) {
  return env[PIN_ENV.sandbox] === "1" ? "https://api-sandbox.pinterest.com/v5" : "https://api.pinterest.com/v5";
}
function basic(env) {
  return {

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/inbox.mjs (reported line 1685)May include surrounding context.

js
"pinterest",
      async (t) => toToken2(
        await postForm(
          "https://api.pinterest.com/v5/oauth/token",
          { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: t.refreshToken },
          basic(env)
        ),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/inbox.mjs (reported line 2036)May include surrounding context.

js
async function call(token, method, body, fetchImpl) {
  const isForm = body instanceof FormData;
  const res = await fetchWithRetry(
    `https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/${method}`,
    {
      method: "POST",
      body: isForm ? body : JSON.stringify(body),

The inbox reads and replies on undeclared platforms, including Google Business Profile reviews.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The fetch loop dispatches to any registered platform found in publication history rather than restricting itself to the platforms advertised by this skill, including Google Business Profile, Bluesky, and Mastodon. When corresponding credentials and publication records exist, this expands data collection and potential authenticated replies beyond the stated scope; interactive reply approval limits, but does not eliminate, that risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.