Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The LinkedIn publishing workflow has approval safeguards, but its setup sends sensitive sign-in responses to a third-party website without explaining that exposure.
Use an HTTPS callback you control instead of copying the supplied third-party URL; that endpoint receives sensitive sign-in parameters. Review socialkit-social-core separately, connect only the intended LinkedIn account, and approve each exact post knowing it will be public. All bundled files were inspected, but the external core dependency and callback service remain outside the verified package.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
1. Sign in once: `node scripts/auth.mjs --platform linkedin --start`, give the user the `signInUrl`, then `node scripts/auth.mjs --platform linkedin --finish --
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
3. Write `post.json` (text, media with alt text, options). See `node scripts/publish.mjs --help`.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
4. Validate: `node scripts/publish.mjs --check --dir li-<slug>`
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
6. Publish: `node scripts/publish.mjs --publish --dir li-<slug>` and report the result.
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
The setup recommends and configures an author-controlled HTTPS callback without explaining that its operator receives the OAuth authorization code and state. This unnecessarily exposes sensitive authorization responses to a third party; the required client secret limits direct code redemption, but does not eliminate callback logging, interception, or manipulation risks.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
return v;
}
function apiBase(env) {
return env[PIN_ENV.sandbox] === "1" ? "https://api-sandbox.pinterest.com/v5" : "https://api.pinterest.com/v5";
}
function basic(env) {
return {
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
async function finishPinterestLogin(pastedUrl, env = process.env, fetchImpl) {
const { code, redirectUri } = finishPasteback("pinterest", pastedUrl, env);
const res = await postForm(
"https://api.pinterest.com/v5/oauth/token",
{ grant_type: "authorization_code", code, redirect_uri: redirectUri, continuous_refresh: "true" },
basic(env),
fetchImpl
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"pinterest",
async (t) => toToken(
await postForm(
"https://api.pinterest.com/v5/oauth/token",
{ grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: t.refreshToken },
basic(env)
),
The CLI actively dispatches to X, TikTok, and Pinterest authentication flows, which request platform-specific OAuth scopes and persist their credentials. It also exposes Pinterest board listing and TikTok creator-information queries at L1309–L1310; these are reachable operations, not merely unused bundled code, and are unjustified for a skill whose stated purpose is publishing to LinkedIn.