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Security audit

Solana

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a read-only Solana lookup tool whose network access is disclosed and aligned with its purpose.

Install this if you are comfortable with wallet addresses, transaction signatures, and token mints being sent to Solana RPC providers and CoinGecko for lookups. Use the default or a trusted HTTPS RPC endpoint, and do not point SOLANA_RPC_URL at a server you do not trust for accuracy or privacy.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 139, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/solana_client.py (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

python
url, headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "HermesAgent/1.0"},
        )
        try:
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
                return json.load(resp)
        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
            if exc.code == 429 and attempt < retries:

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 139, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The RPC client sends requests to RPC_URL, which is sourced from the SOLANA_RPC_URL environment variable without validation. In an agent context, an attacker who can influence environment configuration could redirect all blockchain queries to an arbitrary server, causing silent data exfiltration of queried wallet addresses/transaction IDs and falsified responses that mislead downstream decisions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/solana_client.py (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

python
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, method="POST",
        )
        try:
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:
                body = json.load(resp)
            if "error" in body:
                err = body["error"]

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 139, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

rpc_batch() also posts to the environment-controlled RPC_URL with no validation, creating the same server-side request forgery/configuration hijack risk as the single-call RPC helper. Because batch calls include multiple blockchain queries at once, a malicious endpoint can both observe user-supplied addresses and return crafted chain data that affects wallet, stats, token, and whale outputs.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/solana_client.py (reported line 144)May include surrounding context.

python
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, method="POST",
        )
        try:
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:
                return json.load(resp)
        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
            if exc.code == 429 and attempt < 2:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation instructs use of a Python helper that performs network access and can read environment configuration (SOLANA_RPC_URL), but the skill declares no explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. In an agent platform, missing scope boundaries can let the agent invoke broader capabilities than users or reviewers expect, increasing the risk of unintended outbound requests or environment exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/solana_client.py (reported line 185)May include surrounding context.

python
prices: Dict[str, float] = {}
    for i, mint in enumerate(mints[:max_lookups]):
        url = (
            f"https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/simple/token_price/solana"
            f"?contract_addresses={mint}&vs_currencies=usd"
        )
        data = _http_get_json(url, timeout=10)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/solana_client.py (reported line 203)May include surrounding context.

python
prices: Dict[str, float] = {}
    for i, mint in enumerate(mints[:max_lookups]):
        url = (
            f"https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/simple/token_price/solana"
            f"?contract_addresses={mint}&vs_currencies=usd"
        )
        data = _http_get_json(url, timeout=10)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/solana_client.py (reported line 218)May include surrounding context.

python
prices: Dict[str, float] = {}
    for i, mint in enumerate(mints[:max_lookups]):
        url = (
            f"https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/simple/token_price/solana"
            f"?contract_addresses={mint}&vs_currencies=usd"
        )
        data = _http_get_json(url, timeout=10)

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.