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Security audit

Agentsop Bounded Loop

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill gives safety guidance for bounding AI-agent loops and does not request hidden access, persistence, or unrelated authority.

This appears safe to install as a coding guidance skill. Users should expect it to influence agents toward adding explicit loop limits, failure escalation, and refusing requests to simply raise recursion or iteration limits without diagnosis.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This is a JSON manifest-style file, so vague-trigger review applies. The trigger "Any cyclic LM workflow" is very broad and lacks clear scope boundaries or exclusion conditions, making it unclear when this operation should or should not be selected.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/R2-cross-framework.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

md
| **Claude Agent SDK / Messages API** | `max_tokens` per call | Caller-controlled `max_iterations` / `tool_use_budget`; explicit "step budget" pattern in Computer Use | App code (the SDK does not own the loop) | Letting the model decide via "should I stop?" reflection — same content can be re-emitted forever |
| **OpenAI Agents SDK / Assistants** | `max_completion_tokens`, `max_prompt_tokens` | `max_turns` per Run | Run config | Same reflection footgun; also `tool_choice="auto"` can re-call the same tool |
| **DSPy** | None for inference; `Evaluate` is bounded by dataset size | `max_bootstrapped_demos`, `max_labeled_demos` on optimisers | Optimiser config | "Train until metric stops improving" — no early-stopping primitive ⇒ caller must set explicit budget |
| **AutoGen** | `max_consecutive_auto_reply` per agent | Same | Per-Agent | Group chat can loop forever if every agent's auto-reply triggers another |
| **AutoGPT / BabyAGI** *(historical)* | None initially; later `--continuous-limit` | Explicit step budget required | App code | Self-evaluation "task not complete" → infinite. Why these systems acquired the reputation they did |
| **Aider** | Human REPL as outermost bound | `--auto-test` retries are single-pass; `/test` is one-shot | Aider process state | Auto-fix loop without an explicit retry cap → silent token burn |
| **LangChain `AgentExecutor`** *(legacy)* | `max_iterations=15` hardcoded default | Same + `max_execution_time` | AgentExecutor config | The default was acknowledgement that LMs don't self-terminate |

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

This markdown skill mixes English body text with Chinese headings such as the activation-rules section, but nowhere states that the skill is Chinese-localized only or offers the user a language/locale choice. Under the policy rule, forcing a specific language or locale without opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The phrase "Designing a new cyclic flow" is underspecified and could match a wide range of ordinary design discussions. It does not state the exact conditions under which the operation applies or provide examples of in-scope versus out-of-scope cases.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.