T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:215- Finding
Unpinned External Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent hosted writing-tool skill, but users should be careful with third-party input sharing, paid calls, mutable live instructions, and unpinned setup commands.
Install from reviewed ClawHub/OpenClaw sources where possible, avoid copy-pasting unpinned npx setup commands in sensitive environments, and do not send confidential source material, customer data, secrets, wallet material, signatures, or payment headers as writing context. Confirm paid x402 or credit-spending calls before use, and treat live remote instructions as service data that must not override your agent's safety rules or permission boundaries.
SKILL.md:215Unpinned External Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
SKILL.md:130Remotely Retrieved Instructions Can Override the Audited Local Summary
The 'Search and activation keywords' list includes long generic phrases like 'write original social posts from a topic and a few notes' and 'draft large blog post, topic', which overlap with ordinary user requests about writing. The description does not provide exclusion conditions or negative examples to clarify when this skill should not activate, increasing the risk of unintended invocation.
The skill instructs users to run an unpinned npx skills install command, which fetches code at execution time without a fixed version or integrity guarantee. If the package, dependency chain, or upstream repository is compromised, users could install and execute unexpected code during setup.
This line repeats an unpinned npx skills install path, creating the same supply-chain risk: the installed code may change over time and be attacker-controlled if the publishing channel is compromised. Because npx executes retrieved packages, compromise can translate directly into code execution on the operator's machine.
The unversioned npx skills command allows the fetched installer and dependencies to drift, which is a classic software supply-chain weakness. An attacker who gains control of the package, dependency, or referenced repository could cause arbitrary code execution during installation.
This installation script includes an unpinned npx skills invocation, so the exact code executed is not fixed. That exposes users to upstream package compromise or unexpected behavior changes that could affect credentialed environments used to connect MCP/REST services.
Another unpinned npx skills line introduces mutable remote execution during setup. In a workflow that later handles account connections and payment flows, compromise of the bootstrap step could lead to credential theft or environment tampering.
This repeated use of npx skills without version pinning preserves the same supply-chain and arbitrary-code-execution risk as the other setup lines. Repetition increases exposure because users are more likely to copy-paste one of these commands verbatim.
The reference section again recommends an unpinned npx skills install command, leaving setup dependent on mutable upstream code. That is dangerous because it can silently change after publication and may execute in environments that later process sensitive API credentials or wallet-related data.
This line is a true supply-chain risk for the same reason as the other npx skills references: it executes non-pinned external package code. If upstream components are compromised, the install path can become an initial access vector into the user's machine or agent environment.
An unpinned npx skills command here creates a documented path for executing mutable third-party code. Given the surrounding context of MCP, REST, and payment setup, compromise of this step could cascade into theft of tokens, wallet material, or manipulation of tool calls.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- No-account AgentAddress/x402 setup: ../agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402 (ClawHub: `agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/writing-agent-human-style
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- No-account AgentAddress/x402 setup: ../agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402 (ClawHub: `agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-no-account-agentaddress-x402`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/writing-agent-human-style
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
The schema exposes x402 POST endpoints to an external AgentPMT service and explicitly allows callers to supply large free-form topic, context, source_material, and post content, but it does not clearly warn that this data will be transmitted off-system. This can lead to inadvertent disclosure of sensitive business, customer, or internal content when integrators assume the skill operates locally or within the host agent boundary.