T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:261- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Installer Execution Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill appears to be a legitimate hosted trading-analysis integration, but it needs review because it stores generated financial artifacts in the cloud by default and documents unpinned installer commands.
Before installing, decide whether your OHLCV data, symbols, strategy settings, backtest results, charts, and trade logs can be sent to AgentPMT and retained briefly in cloud storage. For sensitive research, explicitly set `store_charts` and `store_trade_log` to false or minimize `expiration_days`; avoid putting secrets in prompts; and prefer a pinned, verified install path instead of the floating `npx` examples.
SKILL.md:261Unpinned Third-Party Installer Execution Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
schema.md:665Cloud Persistence of Financial Analysis Artifacts Is Enabled by Default
The skill is built around remote MCP/REST calls but does not prominently disclose, near the top-level metadata or usage guidance, that user-supplied OHLCV datasets are sent to external services for processing. While OHLCV data is often non-secret, in this context it may include proprietary strategy research datasets, making undisclosed transmission materially risky.
The skill states that charts and trade logs are stored in cloud storage with signed download URLs, but it does not clearly warn users that submitted market data and derived outputs may be retained externally. This creates a transparency and data-governance issue, especially if users upload proprietary trading datasets or sensitive research outputs.
The skill instructs users to install or update dependencies via npx skills without pinning an exact package version or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised or unexpectedly changed upstream package could alter the installed skill behavior or setup path at execution time.
Using npx skills without version pinning allows the fetched installer or helper package to drift over time. In a skill ecosystem, that can expose users to malicious package substitution, typosquatting, or silent behavior changes during installation.
The install command relies on an unpinned npx package resolution path, which can retrieve whatever version is current at the time of use. This weakens reproducibility and opens a supply-chain avenue if the package or dependency tree is compromised.
An unpinned npx skills invocation means the skill's setup path depends on mutable external package state. Attackers who gain control of the package, its dependencies, or a confusingly similar package name could cause arbitrary code or altered setup instructions to be delivered.
Because npx resolves packages dynamically, leaving the package version unspecified creates an avoidable supply-chain exposure. This is especially relevant in an agent skill distribution context where users may blindly follow setup instructions.
The referenced setup skill installation uses a floating npx skills command, so the user may retrieve a different package version than expected. That undermines trust in the setup chain and can enable package compromise or malicious update scenarios.
This command inherits the same unpinned package resolution risk as the other npx skills references. If the upstream package changes or is compromised, users may execute attacker-controlled install logic while attempting to set up related skills.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/trading-signal-analysis
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/trading-signal-analysis
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
The schema advertises store_charts, store_trade_log, and expiration_days features that persist generated artifacts in cloud storage, but it does not clearly warn users that uploaded OHLCV datasets, symbol labels, or derived trade logs may be retained remotely and remain downloadable for a period of time. In an agent setting, this can cause unintentional disclosure or retention of sensitive or proprietary trading data because callers may assume analysis is transient unless storage behavior is explicitly disclosed.
No suspicious patterns detected.