Back to skill

Security audit

quantum-circuit-builder-with-proof

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed remote AgentPMT skill for quantum circuit proof work, with expected data-sharing and setup risks but no evidence of hidden or malicious behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the relevant quantum circuits, claims, certificates, and any submitted Lean source to AgentPMT. Do not submit secrets or proprietary Lean/source unless your organization approves that data boundary, and review or pin the companion setup skills before using the unpinned npx install commands.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:361
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 361-377
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

The Skill instructs users to install additional AgentPMT Skills from mutable external sources without pinning an immutable version, commit, or integrity digest.

markdown
If those setup skills are not installed beside this product skill, use the downloads below.

Core AgentPMT setup skills:
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt
  - ClawHub page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt
  - OpenClaw install: `openclaw skills install what-is-agentpmt`
  - skills.sh install: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
  - ClawHub page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
  - OpenClaw install: `openclaw skills install agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`
  - skills.sh install: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`

skills.sh install script:

```bash
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup

Technical Analysis

The installation commands resolve content from external package, repository, and Skill-distribution infrastructure at installation time. They do not specify an immutable package version, repository commit, signed release, or expected content digest. Consequently, the installed content can differ from the content available when this Skill was audited.

This is especially sensitive for the account setup dependency because it is intended to guide MCP or REST authentication. If the external source, publisher account, package registry, repository, or distribution channel were compromised, altered setup content could attempt to capture credentials, redirect API traffic, introduce ...[truncated 2092 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin every external package or Skill to an immutable, reviewed version and, where supported, a specific repository commit.
  2. Publish and verify cryptographic integrity hashes or signed manifests for downloaded Skill artifacts.
  3. Avoid relying on floating repository branches or package tags for security-sensitive setup instructions.
  4. Document the expected publisher identity, package source, version, commit, and checksum beside each installation command.
  5. Prefer a reviewed lockfile or bundled, signed setup dependency over runtime resolution from mutable external sources.
  6. Where the package manager permits it, disable lifecycle scripts and other unnecessary installation-time code execution.
  7. Require explicit user confirmation before installing external Skills, particularly account and credential-management Skills.
  8. Review the downloaded setup Skill before use and ensure that it does not request secrets through prompts or logs.
  9. Run installation with the minimum filesystem and system permissions necessary, without administrator privileges.
  10. Retain the existing warning not to place account secrets, wallet private keys, mnemonics, signatures, or payment headers in prompts or logs.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (11)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 277)May include surrounding context.

md
Complete generated action schema: `./schema.md`.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises highly generic activation keywords such as 'circuit' and 'claims', which can cause it to trigger in unrelated contexts. That increases the chance of unnecessary external tool invocation and unintended transmission of user-supplied content to a remote service, especially because this skill supports paid remote actions and handles trusted Lean source in some flows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill is explicitly designed to send circuits, claims, and possibly Lean source to external AgentPMT endpoints. This creates a real data egress boundary: sensitive research artifacts or trusted Lean code may be transmitted to a third-party service, and the skill itself notes that some Lean execution occurs in a shared container without untrusted-code isolation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 529)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/quantum-circuit-builder-with-proof
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The documented REST invoke endpoint confirms that this skill depends on external network transmission for core operations. In context, the danger is elevated because users may submit proprietary circuit designs or internally trusted Lean source to a remote environment that is authenticated but not sandboxed as untrusted code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 530)May include surrounding context.

md
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/quantum-circuit-builder-with-proof
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.