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Security audit

plaud-transcripts-corrected-with-your-own-terminology-glossary

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill’s transcript workflow is coherent, but it asks users to run mutable installer commands and connect sensitive transcript services without enough setup scoping or privacy guidance.

Review this skill before installing. Use least-privilege Plaud and Google accounts, restrict it to specific sheets/docs/folders where possible, avoid confidential or regulated recordings unless you have consent and retention controls, and prefer pinned or reviewed installer versions instead of running the floating `npx` commands as written.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:33
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installer and Mutable Remote Dependencies

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 33–38
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies and unsafe remote installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown
skills.sh install script:

```bash
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
text

### Technical Analysis

The setup instructions invoke the `skills` npm package through `npx` without specifying an audited package version. They also install skills from `AgentPMT/agent-skills` without pinning the source to an immutable commit, signed release, or verified artifact checksum.

Because both dependency references are mutable, the components executed or installed at deployment time may differ from those reviewed during this audit. The same unpinned installation pattern is repeated for other workflow dependencies later in `SKILL.md`.

An attacker who compromises the npm package, its maintainer account, the remote skill repository, or the corresponding distribution infrastructure could publish altered installer behavior or malicious skill instructions. A dependency-confusion or package-takeover event could similarly cause `npx` to resolve and execute an untrusted package.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises or takes control of the unversioned `skills` npm package, the `AgentPMT/agent-skills` repository, or an associated publishing account.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version or modifies one of the remotely hosted skills.
3. A user follows the documented setup procedure and runs the unpinned `npx skills add` command.
4. `npx` resolves and executes the currently published package rather than a previously audited version.
5. The installer retrieves mutable skill content from the remote repository.
6. The malicious dependency may execute with the invoking user's privileges or install 
...[truncated 901 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the npm CLI to a specific audited version, for example by using an exact version rather than an unqualified npx skills invocation.
  2. Pin AgentPMT/agent-skills to an immutable commit hash or cryptographically signed release instead of relying on the repository's current default branch.
  3. Record and verify cryptographic checksums or signatures for every installed skill artifact.
  4. Use npx --no-install with a locally installed, lockfile-controlled dependency where feasible, preventing silent retrieval of an unexpected package.
  5. Commit a package lockfile and use a deterministic installation command such as npm ci when an npm project is involved.
  6. Vendor and review the required skill definitions when operationally practical.
  7. Restrict installation to a sandboxed, least-privileged environment without production credentials or sensitive mounted directories.
  8. Review installed skills before granting access to Plaud, Google Sheets, Google Docs, or other authenticated integrations.
  9. Replace the instruction to reinstall automatically when content becomes stale with a controlled update process that performs signature verification, change review, and approval before installation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (17)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill processes Plaud transcripts, sends data through external connectors, and writes corrected transcripts and summaries to Google Docs/Sheets, yet it does not prominently warn users that potentially sensitive spoken content will be transmitted to multiple third-party services. This omission can lead users to expose confidential, regulated, or privileged information without informed consent or appropriate safeguards.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill repeatedly instructs users to install tooling via unpinned npx skills commands, which fetches the latest package version at execution time. If the package or one of its dependencies is compromised upstream, users could install and run attacker-controlled code, creating a software supply-chain risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This line references an unversioned npx skills install path, meaning the resolved package can change over time without review. That exposes users to supply-chain compromise or unexpected behavior if the package publisher account or dependency tree is hijacked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

An unpinned npx skills invocation causes remote code to be fetched dynamically, which is unsafe in security-sensitive workflow setup documentation. Because npx prefers the latest matching package, a malicious or broken release could affect all future installations immediately.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This installation example also uses unpinned npx skills, introducing a supply-chain trust issue. Anyone following the instructions may execute code from a package version that was never reviewed when the skill was authored.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The line instructs a floating npx skills install for a dependent skill, which inherits the same package substitution and compromised-publisher risks. In aggregate, multiple such references expand the attack surface and normalize unsafe installation practices.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

Using unversioned npx skills to install the Google Sheets-related tool makes the workflow depend on mutable upstream code. A compromised release could gain access to connected cloud data or OAuth flows during setup or execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This line installs the Plaud tool via an unpinned npx command, creating a non-deterministic and potentially unsafe install path. Since the workflow processes recordings and transcripts, compromise here could expose sensitive audio-derived data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The unpinned npx skills reference for the Google Docs connector leaves the installation vulnerable to malicious upstream changes. Because the connector writes summaries and transcripts to third-party documents, compromise could lead to data exfiltration or tampering.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This repeated unpinned installer reference propagates the same supply-chain risk into the logging step's Google Sheets dependency. An attacker controlling the installed package could access processed logs, document links, and potentially transcript metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The tool skill links section repeats an unpinned npx skills command, which is still actionable installation guidance and therefore still risky. Repetition increases the chance users will execute it without noticing the lack of version control.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This unversioned npx skills reference for Google Sheets is a true supply-chain weakness for the same reason as earlier entries. Given the workflow's access to glossary data and logs, package compromise could expose user-specific terminology and processing history.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The Plaud tool link includes another unpinned install command, allowing future package changes to alter what users execute. Since this connector handles recordings and transcripts, the confidentiality implications are meaningful in context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The Google Docs connector entry uses floating npx skills installation guidance, creating avoidable supply-chain exposure. A malicious package update could modify, leak, or corrupt generated documents containing corrected transcripts and action items.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This tool link again recommends unpinned npx skills, making the installed code dependent on mutable upstream state. In a workflow touching multiple external services, that broadens the blast radius of any package compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The reference section includes another unpinned package install command, which is a genuine supply-chain concern even though it is ancillary documentation. Security risk remains because users may still execute the command exactly as written.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This final unpinned npx skills setup reference has the same core issue: it executes mutable upstream code without a fixed version. In a workflow involving account and connector setup, compromise could affect authentication context and connected services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.