T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:232- Finding
Mutable Remote Instructions Can Override the Audited Skill Definition
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Pipedrive skill is mostly coherent with CRM automation, but it grants broad CRM write, delete, file-transfer, and persistent webhook authority without enough local guardrails.
Review before installing. Use least-privilege Pipedrive scopes, require explicit confirmation for deletes, file transfers, lead conversion, and webhook creation, avoid wildcard webhooks, only send webhook events to verified destinations, and prefer pinned setup dependencies over the provided unpinned npx commands.
SKILL.md:232Mutable Remote Instructions Can Override the Audited Skill Definition
SKILL.md:138Arbitrary Persistent Webhooks Can Exfiltrate CRM Event Data
SKILL.md:297Installation Instructions Use Unpinned Remote Dependencies
The skill prominently supports destructive and data-affecting actions including create, update, delete, convert_lead, file upload/download, and webhook subscription, but it lacks an explicit warning section requiring user confirmation for high-impact operations. In this CRM context, accidental execution can modify sales records, remove data, trigger downstream automations, or expose information via webhooks to third-party endpoints.
The activation keywords are broad phrases like creating, updating, moving deals, and scheduling follow-ups, which can cause the skill to be selected in loosely related contexts. In an agentic environment with write-capable CRM actions, over-broad invocation scope increases the chance of unintended record modification, lead conversion, webhook creation, or data disclosure to the external service.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/pipedrive
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/pipedrive
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
The schema exposes webhook creation, listing, and deletion capabilities that are not disclosed in the manifest description. Hidden event-subscription functionality expands the skill's authority beyond expected CRM CRUD operations and can be abused to exfiltrate CRM changes to attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoints or establish persistent monitoring.
Webhook subscription creation is not necessary for the manifest's described use of managing sales workflows, creating records, and moving deals through stages. Because webhooks can send ongoing CRM event data to external endpoints, this capability materially increases the danger of covert monitoring and exfiltration in a way that the stated skill context does not justify.
The schema includes file download, upload, update, and deletion operations that go beyond the manifest's stated sales-workflow purpose. This undisclosed file-management surface can be used to extract attachments into AgentPMT File Manager, alter evidence, or remove files, increasing data-loss and data-exfiltration risk.
The schema permits linking external Google Drive files into Pipedrive, but this cross-system integration is not mentioned in the manifest. Undisclosed remote-file linkage can introduce unauthorized data sharing paths, confuse trust boundaries, and help an attacker associate external content with sensitive CRM records.
No suspicious patterns detected.