T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:289- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation Creates Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a disclosed MongoDB connector, but it gives agents broad database-changing and administrative authority with weak scoping around destructive actions and live remote instructions.
Install only if you trust AgentPMT and can restrict the connected MongoDB account and platform permissions to the minimum needed. Avoid granting delete or admin permissions for production data unless you require them, review live instructions before acting on them, and treat exports as sensitive files.
SKILL.md:289Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation Creates Supply-Chain Risk
SKILL.md:226Mutable Remote Instructions Can Override the Audited Local Specification
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Complete generated action schema: `./schema.md`.
The schema explicitly exposes a run_command action that accepts any MongoDB command document, which bypasses the narrower 'permission-gated' framing in the skill description and enables administrative or destructive operations well beyond simple querying and export. In a remote tool context, this materially expands the attack surface to include data destruction, metadata disclosure, privilege abuse, and denial-of-service depending on the connected account's database privileges.
The skill promotes export-to-CSV/JSON features but does not clearly warn that exported query results may contain sensitive records and may be written to downloadable files outside the original database controls. In this context, the tool is specifically designed to access user databases, so omission of an export sensitivity warning increases the likelihood of unintended data exposure through files and downstream handling.
The skill promotes export-to-CSV/JSON features but does not clearly warn that exported query results may contain sensitive records and may be written to downloadable files outside the original database controls. In this context, the tool is specifically designed to access user databases, so omission of an export sensitivity warning increases the likelihood of unintended data exposure through files and downstream handling.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/mongodb-connector
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/mongodb-connector
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
This markdown schema lists bulk_write as supporting delete and replace operations, which can permanently modify or remove data, but it provides no warning or cautionary note for users. Under the markdown-specific warning rule, destructive behaviours that can affect user data should be disclosed clearly in the skill description.
The delete_documents action explicitly deletes one or many documents and even supports deleting all matches, but the description contains no warning about permanence or accidental broad deletion. For markdown skill descriptions, destructive operations affecting user data should include a user-facing caution.
The drop_collection action removes an entire collection, which is a destructive and potentially irreversible operation, yet the documentation presents it without any caution. Users should be warned when a skill can affect system integrity or permanently destroy stored data.
The find_one_and_delete action atomically deletes a document and returns it, but the schema text does not warn that the matched record will be removed from the database. This is a data-affecting behaviour that should be disclosed in markdown documentation.
The schema describes unrestricted database command execution and provides no warning or limitation on potentially destructive commands. In this connector context, that omission is more dangerous because agents may treat schema-described actions as routine and invoke commands that alter state, expose sensitive metadata, or disrupt service if the connected identity has sufficient privileges.