T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:287- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a legitimate location-imagery purpose, but it handles precise location data while relying on mutable remote instructions and unpinned setup commands.
Install only if you are comfortable sending addresses or coordinates to AgentPMT and receiving hosted image links retained for 7 days. Prefer the OpenClaw install route or pinned, reviewed versions for supporting skills, and do not let remote live instructions override your agent’s normal safety rules or broaden the task beyond the specific location-imagery request.
SKILL.md:287Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
SKILL.md:208Mutable Remote Instructions Are Given Precedence Over the Audited Skill
The skill describes functionality but does not prominently warn that addresses/coordinates are transmitted to a remote hosted service and that returned imagery is stored for 7 days. This creates a privacy and consent risk, especially for sensitive locations such as homes, workplaces, or critical sites, because users may not realize data leaves the local agent boundary.
The activation keywords include very generic terms such as geocode and address, which can cause the skill to be selected for ordinary user requests unrelated to intended, consented remote transmission. Because this skill sends location data to a hosted third-party service and stores imagery for 7 days, over-broad triggering increases the chance of accidental privacy-impacting use.
The skill instructs users to install supporting skills via npx skills ... without pinning a specific package version or immutable source revision. This creates a supply-chain risk: a later compromised or malicious package update could be fetched and executed in the user's environment when they follow the installation instructions.
This line references an unpinned npx skills installation command for a related setup skill. Because npx resolves packages dynamically, users may execute unintended or newly published code if the upstream package changes or is hijacked.
The skill includes another npx skills install path without version pinning, expanding the attack surface for supply-chain compromise. Even though this is documentation rather than executable code in the skill itself, it can still induce risky operator behavior.
The referenced install instruction uses npx skills without a pinned version for the what-is-agentpmt skill. This permits execution of whatever current package version is served at install time, which is a classic supply-chain integrity weakness.
This adjacent install instruction also uses an unpinned npx skills command for agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup. A compromised package publisher, registry entry, or dependency update could lead users to execute malicious code during setup.
The reference section repeats an unpinned npx skills command. Repetition increases the likelihood users will copy and run a mutable installer command, preserving the same supply-chain execution risk.
This is another unpinned npx skills installation example in the reference section, carrying the same risk of dynamic code execution from a mutable upstream source. In security-sensitive agent environments, setup instructions are part of the trusted attack surface.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/location-street-view-satellite-imagery
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/location-street-view-satellite-imagery
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
The schema documents geocoding, reverse geocoding, satellite imagery, and Street View retrieval using precise addresses and coordinates, but it provides no privacy or sensitive-location handling guidance. Because these inputs can reveal home addresses, travel patterns, or exact property locations, an agent could collect, transmit, or retain highly sensitive location data without appropriate safeguards.
No suspicious patterns detected.