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Security audit

Global Digital Economy Connectivity Data

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a documented AgentPMT data-query guide with some quality and supply-chain cautions, but no hidden execution, persistence, or destructive behavior in the inspected artifacts.

Install only if you intend to use AgentPMT's hosted, paid digital-economy data tool. Review any related setup skills before installing them, prefer pinned or trusted installation routes where available, and do not rely on this skill for actual EGDI or e-government readiness scores despite the marketing text.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:278
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 278–293
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies and remotely retrieved skills
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

text
Core AgentPMT setup skills:
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt
  - ClawHub page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt
  - OpenClaw install: `openclaw skills install what-is-agentpmt`
  - skills.sh install: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
  - ClawHub page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
  - OpenClaw install: `openclaw skills install agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`
  - skills.sh install: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`

skills.sh install script:

```bash
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
text

### Technical Analysis

The setup instructions retrieve third-party packages and skills without pinning the npm command-line package to an exact version or pinning the remote skills repository to an immutable commit. No checksum, signature, or other integrity verification is specified.

Consequently, the content installed when a user runs these commands can differ from the content available when this artifact was audited. If the npm package, ClawHub entry, source repository, publisher account, or distribution infrastructure is compromised, the installation can introduce attacker-controlled code or Skill instructions.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence of an embedded malicious payload in the current project. The project itself contains only Markdown files, and no malicious local script was identified.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises an upstream package, skills repository, 
...[truncated 1312 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the skills npm package to an audited exact version instead of invoking an unspecified current release.
  2. Pin AgentPMT/agent-skills to an immutable commit hash, signed release, or content digest.
  3. Pin OpenClaw-installed skills to immutable versions where the package manager supports version constraints.
  4. Publish expected SHA-256 checksums or cryptographic signatures and require verification before installation.
  5. Vendor reviewed setup instructions within the project when feasible, reducing dependence on mutable remote content.
  6. Display the resolved source, version, permissions, and integrity information and require explicit user confirmation before installation.
  7. Run installation in a sandbox or least-privileged environment without unnecessary credentials or access to sensitive files.
  8. Re-audit downloaded skills and their transitive dependencies before enabling them in production.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (11)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest description explicitly says the skill can query and analyze e-government readiness. However, the body later states that the World Bank data does not include EGDI directly and that the e_government aspect returns an empty indicator set, meaning this advertised capability is not actually provided.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The listed search and activation keywords include generic phrases such as "query digital data" and "country or region," which are broad enough to overlap with ordinary requests and may cause unintended invocation. The file does not provide negative examples or explicit boundaries for when the skill should not activate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The use-case section actively tells users they can 'Analyze e-government readiness scores.' Elsewhere, the notes clearly state that the e_government aspect returns an empty indicator set because the underlying data source does not include EGDI, which directly contradicts the claimed use case.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 355)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/digital-economy-technology
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 356)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/digital-economy-technology
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.