Security audit

Global Agriculture Food Security Data

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed remote agriculture-data connector with no malicious local behavior found, but users should be careful with paid calls and unpinned setup installs.

Install only when you intend to use AgentPMT for paid agriculture and food-security data queries. Prefer reviewed or pinned installation paths for the referenced setup skills, review those setup skills before entering account credentials, and keep secrets, wallet material, and payment headers out of prompts and logs.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:293
Finding: Unpinned Third-Party Installation Commands Create a Supply-Chain Risk
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (9)

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 92% confidence
Finding: The activation keywords include broad phrases like general research requests about food security, crop yields, and agricultural productivity. Overbroad trigger language can cause unintended auto-selection of this remote tool in ordinary conversations, increasing the chance of unnecessary external calls, data disclosure in prompts, or unreviewed paid actions.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: The skill instructs users to install supporting skills via npx skills add ... without pinning a specific package or repository version. This creates a supply-chain risk: a later malicious or compromised package/revision could be fetched and executed during installation, especially because npx resolves live remote content at install time.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: This line repeats an unpinned npx skills add ... installation path for a dependency skill. Because the fetched package/version is not fixed, users may install changed or malicious code in the future, turning documentation into an indirect code-execution vector.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: The installation example again uses npx skills add with no version pinning for what-is-agentpmt. Even though this is documentation, it can still lead operators to execute unreviewed remote package content if the upstream package changes or is compromised.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: This command similarly installs agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup via a floating npx invocation. That exposes users to supply-chain compromise and inconsistent behavior across time because the exact executed code is not fixed.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: The reference section repeats an unpinned npx skills add command. Repetition increases the likelihood that users will copy and run a non-reproducible install command, inheriting any future upstream compromise.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: This unversioned npx skills add command poses the same supply-chain risk as the earlier instances. Since it relates to account/MCP setup, compromise here could be especially sensitive because the installed code may later handle credentials or broker remote tool access.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 50% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 365)May include surrounding context.
md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`) - AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`) - Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/agriculture-food-security - AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/ - AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 50% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 366)May include surrounding context.
md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`) - AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`) - Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/agriculture-food-security - AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/ - AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.